TRIUMPHS OF THE ROOSEVELT ADMINISTRATION

HOWLAND



THEODORE ROOSEVELT.

TRIUMPHS

OF THE

ROOSEVELT ADMINISTRATION

BY

JOHN A. HOWLAND

WITH INTRODUCTIONS BY

CHARLES DICK
[SENATOR FROM OHIO]

AND

CHAUNCEY M. DEPEW
[SENATOR FROM NEW YORK]

CHICAGO:
REPUBLICAN PUBLISHING CO.
1904

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

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INTRODUCTION

BY CHARLES DICK, SENATOR FROM OHIO

Theodore Roosevelt will go down in history as the man who has broken many precedents in as thorough a manner as he is reported to have broken "bucking bronchos" in the West. He was nominated for vice-president against his desire and over his vigorous protest. He was then governor of New York, an office to which he was elected on his war record at a time when the military enthusiasm growing out of the war with Spain remained unabated, and under conditions which did not argue any too well for Republican success. As it was, the margin of victory was narrow. In the majority of instances in which a New Yorker has come to the presidential chair it has been by the death of the man who was elected president, and since the Republican party came into existence it has occurred twice through the

premeditated death of an Ohio man elected president.

On that sad day on which his lamented and beloved predecessor passed away and Theodore Roosevelt took the oath of office as president, he promised faithfully to carry out the policies of McKinley. It is because he has been true to that pledge that he will be nominated for president by acclamation in the Republican National Convention at Chicago.

He is the first accidental president who has been so honored, and he promises to break precedent again by being his own successor. Our presidents have been soldiers or lawyers, and Roosevelt is no exception to that rule, though his military career was only a passing incident in a busy life, and his fame was won in an engagement which would have been counted one of the lesser battles of our civil war. That was not his fault, however, and he did the best he could.

He has been distinctively a man of public affairs. Politics has been his voca-

tion and literature his avocation. In the twenty-five years since he attained his majority he has held office seventeen years and in addition was the unsuccessful Republican candidate for mayor of New York when he was twenty-eight years of age.

His first appearance in national politics was that day in June, 1884, when he walked down the center aisle of the convention held at Chicago arm in arm with George William Curtis representing the State of New York after he had made the fight which cost President Arthur the support of his own state. He was then a youth of twenty-six years.

His contributions to literature constitute a small library. No man, therefore, has been more in the public eye in the last quarter of a century. In that time he has played many parts and has played them all remarkably well. In all of them he has displayed certain characteristics which have come to be known as distinctively Rooseveltian.

He is the man of action, the man of strong elemental passions held under strict control, the man who always has a definite aim and is determined to bring about results. He has the spirit of the pioneer and will hew a pathway of his own if he does not find one at hand. Where there is the will, he will find the way. Thus he has been enabled to do things and in all he has done he has been actuated by high moral motives.

An aggravated and long drawn out strike in Pennsylvania had paralyzed the anthracite coal business and caused much suffering. Winter was approaching and there was prospect of untold misery because of the failure of fuel. The constitution afforded no remedy and the state was powerless. The President was equal to the occasion. He went outside the constitution and by virtue of his position as first citizen of the land settled the strike. The country applauded and the trouble has not recurred.

He found an irritating boundary dispute with irresponsible neighbors in the Northwest which had vexed us for years. He adopted a common sense plan which he was told was impracticable, and lo! the boundary dispute was settled and so satisfactorily that while both sides claimed a victory, our interests were fully protected.

He incurred displeasure by summoning Congress in special session to enact legislation demanded by our interest and our honor in order to carry into effect a commercial treaty with Cuba, failure to enact which, he declared, "would come perilously near a repudiation of the pledged faith of the nation." The pledge was kept and that Cuban question is heard of no more.

He brought the machinery of law to bear to oust the Northern Securities Company. It was not claimed that this merger operated oppressively or that the interests of the people were suffering therefrom, but the President declared the law was being violated and thought it was unsafe to trust

so much authority in any one set of hands. The courts sustained the President and gave new vitality to the anti-trust law. The supremacy of law was vindicated when applied to tremendous corporate interests as well as when directed against the most indigent offender.

He has been equally vigorous and equally successful in his foreign policy. He has been firm and forceful whether dealing with petty misrule and organized anarchy in San Domingo, urging the just claims of Americans against the Sultan of Turkey, demanding the open door in Manchuria, or resisting European pretensions in South America. He has fixed more firmly than ever before the over-lordship of the United States in the Western hemisphere and written the Monroe Doctrine anew as the regulator of foreign interference in the affairs of the Americas.

He was not afraid to make use of the opportunity to advance national interests in Panama. He followed precedent and acted within the strict letter of law and

treaty, and by his wise foresight and prompt action insured the early commencement of the Panama Canal. The nations of the world approved his course, and American prestige abroad has been increased.

Theodore Roosevelt is an American of Americans, broad and catholic in everything. He is healthy, robust and exuberant, and a man of universal interests. There is no branch of learning which does not attract him. His reading has been omnivorous. He is therefore interested in all men who have a message to give and he extracts the kernel from every man he meets. He is sometimes compared to Emperor William II. The Kaiser has reigned fifteen years and in that time the unexpected has always been looked for but never came. So the unexpected has been predicted from Roosevelt, but he has disappointed such anticipations. He is impetuosity under splendid restraint. Clean himself, he demands the same virtue in his subordinates. An immaculate official

record will not protect an official whom he discovers to be morally unclean. He makes no attempt to conceal his convictions, once fixed they are firmly held, for he believes in standing by his principles. He has high standards of civic righteousness and is a crusader for all that is clean and wholesome. He is unlike the Knight of La Mancha for he never runs at windmills. Many reformers are not practical. His much living outdoors has strengthened in him the grace of practicality and common sense. He has lived close to nature and has been in close touch with human nature. He therefore knows men, a knowledge which has served him well.

He is not unmindful of the value of organization, but relies much on appeals to moral sentiment. Since Andrew Jackson no such aggressive and forceful personality has occupied the White House.

WILLIAM H. TAFT,
Secretary of War.

PROGRESS DURING PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION.

BY CHAUNCEY M. DEPEW, SENATOR FROM NEW YORK

There have been glorious decades in our national story from 1860 to 1900—saving the Union, emancipation, reconstruction, the resumption of specie payments—all of which loosened the energies of the American people and bent American genius and industry to the development of our resources. The farseeing mind and the courage of our business men, the skill of our artisans, our farmers and our miners, have placed us in the front rank among the producing nations of the world. In the midst of prosperity never before equaled, of employment, markets and opportunities never before possessed, we tried the experiment for four years of a new policy. From the ruin which involved us all, we emerged, under McKinley and Roosevelt.

Not only that, but more—we have repaired the disasters from 1893 to 1897. We have opened the closed factories and mills; we have built up new industries and removed every trace of the devastations of semi-free trade and unsound currency. The distress from putting into legislation false theories may be greater in our commercial and industrial age than those which followed in the track of armies in former generations. The task of the Republican party when it came into power with McKinley and a Republican Congress was to remove handicaps upon American enterprise and energy and furnish the basis for prosperity. The enactment of the Dingley law and the gold standard of value, in the wonderful results which followed in the South as well as the North, in the East as well as the West, was a fitting close to the contribution made to the greatness of our country and the happiness of our people by the Republican party from 1860 to the close of the nineteenth century.

There was one other measure required to enable the people to take advantage of conditions brought about by the Dingley tariff and the gold standard. A large proportion of our business men and corporations had gone down under loads of debt which could never be lifted during the panic times from 1893 to 1897. We cleared the way for them to take advantage of the situation by the enactment of a general bankruptcy law, a law which has not been a vital necessity at the close of any Republican administration. It is the best tribute to the prosperity resulting from the measures which came after 1896, and to the inherent honesty of American business men that nine-tenths of those who were compelled to take advantage of this remedial measure, have since, in their abundant success, paid principal and interest of their indebtedness.

But the nineteenth century closed, not only with phenomenal prosperity, not only with the balance of trade in our favor greater than the accumulated sum of all our previous history, not only with the

farmer, the manufacturer, the artisan, and the worker happy and hopeful, but with all this accomplished notwithstanding a foreign war. In ninety days the conflict was over, and the republic was facing new and untried problems. It had the unrest of Cuba which had lasted for three hundred years upon its hands, the poverty of Porto Rico and chronic insurrections in the Philippines, but to-day Cuba holds an honorable place among nations, Porto Rico is lifted into healthful and prosperous conditions, insurrections have ceased in the Philippines, and their ten millions of people, with singular unanimity, are eagerly acquiring American education, liberty and law. This has been brought about by President Roosevelt.

The problem of four hundred years seemed about to be settled and the two oceans united by the canal across the isthmus. With the growth of our Pacific Coast States and the possession of our islands across the ocean and the trade of the Orient, the building of this canal became

a necessity of paramount importance. All other measures dwindled into insignificance compared with the opening of this highway. The situation was intense and the changes dramatic. Colombia proposed to the United States a treaty called the Hay-Herran Treaty, naming the terms of the concession and asking for its ratification by the United States. The French Canal Company conceded to the modification of their proposal which our commission had recommended. The accomplishment of the desired result depended only upon the formality of the ratification by the Colombian Congress of the treaty proposed by their dictator and accepted by the United States when he had under the explicit terms of their constitution full power to make it.

But the dictator, now President, had Congress called together for that purpose and saw a superb opportunity of a hold-up in the necessities of the United States. Day after day the warning went forth from Bogota from the representatives of the Department of Panama and to Bogota

from Panama itself, that if the treaty was rejected, Panama would reassert the independence which had been violently taken from her eighteen years ago. The Colombian Congress, in their territorial isolation and subordination to their dictator and President, failed to comprehend the gravity of the situation. While this treaty, the most important document in their history, was pending in their Senate and House, they adjourned for a day to have read to them the sonnets which had been written by one of their poetic deputies.

The occasion, however, was not one for verse to Venus, and the situation not an opera bouffe, for Theodore Roosevelt was President of the United States. When Panama fulfilled the threat known to all the world for months and successfully accomplished her revolution, the President acted within his constitutional privilege with the directness, courage and wisdom characteristic of his whole public life. He was under the mandate of a law passed at the last session of Congress which au-

thorized the purchase of the French canal properties, which appropriated $10,000,000 for immediate purposes and authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to borrow $130,000,000 more, which directed the President to make the terms for the building of the canal and then to begin. If he failed within a reasonable time to secure the concession then he was to turn to Nicaragua and Costa Rica.

But without any intervention or action on his part in the kaleidoscope of politics common to the Latin nations of Central and South America, the opportunity was presented and he seized it. He might have let a war go on between Panama and Colombia. He might have commenced fruitless negotiations with Nicaragua and Costa Rica. He might have transferred the whole question to Congress, weakly abandoning his executive responsibility, but the mandate of the American people was upon him to build the isthmian canal, and the Congress, by the unanimous vote of the Senators and members of the House of Rep-

resentatives on the Republican side and a large number of Senators and members of the House on the Democratic side, have affirmed the wisdom and the constitutionality of his course.

It is an interesting question: Where have those of the opposition been during these epoch making times, and where are they now? They were against the gold standard of value, and part of them are still. They were against the tariff, and all of them are now. They opposed our holding Cuba and insisted upon its immediately receiving independence, when the wisdom of McKinley said, "We will take the time necessary for the Cubans to learn after three hundred years of tyranny the primary lessons of representative government, of liberty." In the mean time we will, by sanitation, remove from our own country the peril of yellow fever which has so often come from Cuba and devastated us. Now, they admit we were right.

They proposed free trade to Porto Rico which would have pauperized her and

made her a beneficiary of the United States Treasury. But the Republican majority devised a tariff of limited operations which has placed that island in conditions of prosperity never before dreamed of by its people. They were opposed, and are still, to the retention of the Philippines, while the Republican administration has sent there a thousand school teachers, has spent millions in opening roads, has reclaimed the land from the orders upon a fair understanding and adjustment and then transferred it to the people under the operation of our wise homestead laws. The moneys spent in the Philippine Islands which have been of such incalculable value in the development of their resources and for the employment and wealth of their people have come from a taxation on themselves which has not been felt because of their prosperity. Under the Spanish rule all the taxes went to Spain. Under American rule all the taxes are spent upon and for the people of the islands. The lessons of representative government, of liberty

and of law are being learned more rapidly among the tribes of the archipelago than among any such people ever before, and the peace and happiness which prevail are lessons in colonial administration to the governments which have been ruling colonies for centuries.

The opposition stand for negation and allegation. Instead of having a live programme to present to the American people which will intelligently promise an improvement of existing conditions, they are looking for issues among the debris and the scaffolding thrown aside by the Republicans after their beneficent structures have been completed.

Our Democratic friends admit that prosperity is greater than ever before, but they say that it is not due to the protective tariff, it is not due to the American markets for Americans, it is not due to the gold standard of value, it is not due to Republican policies and administrations, but that God has wrought it all.

Speaking with due reverence, if this be

true, why is it that He gives prosperity only in Republican administrations and disaster under Democratic Presidents? The broader and better view is that a merciful Providence gives to man the earth and the fulness thereof for his enjoyment according to the qualities which will enable him to succeed. Those qualities were exhibited in every Republican administration and the opposite in the only two Democratic administrations we remember, the one from 1856 to 1860, the other from 1893 to 1897. The founder of the great banking house of Rothschilds was asked to what he ascribed his phenomenal success in the terrible competitions of his period when he started from such humble beginnings. His answer was, "I never would have business transactions with unlucky men." Then why should the American people think for a moment of abandoning conditions of unusual prosperity for partnership with the hard luck party?

They say the President is rash. He was rash, when, as Assistant Secretary of the

Navy, he paralyzed the bureau officers by ordering the navy to burn powder in target practice. But that rashness materialized in the highest conservatism when those gunners, under Dewey, sank the fleet at Manila Bay in fifty minutes, and Cervera's fleet at Santiago in sixty. All of his acquaintances said he was rash when he threw up a comfortable berth in the Navy Department to take upon himself the perils of the campaign in Cuba; that he was rash when, at the head of his regiment, he encountered volleys of Spanish bullets in battle, but that rashness displayed the qualities which make the American people both trust and love him.

He has probed deeply the great departments of the government and prosecuted and convicted those of his own household of faith who were found guilty. He enforced the law when dire predictions of disaster were made, and by doing so lost the favor of some of the ablest and strongest of our financial leaders, but the Supreme Court has sustained his action and

the markets have rebounded with that phenomenal rise in the securities affected which demonstrates the judgment of the investors of the country.

The completion of the isthmian canal will bring the cities on the Atlantic coast nearer the Orient than the ports of continental Europe or Great Britain. Its construction will revolutionize the commerce of the world and incalculably promote the position and prosperity of the United States. The President's advocacy of a large navy which will make us the second maritime power of the world is a wise and farsighted policy to meet the expansion of commerce which must come to us by the isthmian canal and the open door from American diplomacy. To ask for an open door for the surplus products of American industry with neither a mercantile marine nor battleships would be the worst sort of weakness, but when the greatest and strongest and richest nation of the world asks for an open door with a fleet commensurate with its power, necessities

and rights, the answer will be a welcome without a shot fired or the peace of the world disturbed.

With a past unequalled in its splendor, a present unsurpassed in its beneficence, issues as clear as the sunlight and a candidate who represents better than almost any man in our history the vigorous life, integrity, ability and patriotism of typical Americanism, the Republican party will march once more to victory.

CHAPTER I.

THE SCHOOLING OF A PRESIDENT.

ON the afternoon of September 14, 1901, Theodore Roosevelt became president of the United States. He had been called to that high office by a tragedy. William McKinley had been stricken to his death by an assassin's hand. He had just entered upon his second term and the nation was at the flood of the greatest tide of prosperity it had ever known. Never before had the prestige of the United States been so great abroad. Never before had confidence in the government been so secure at home. American finance was unassailable. American industry was conquering the markets of the world. Not a cloud appeared on the business horizon. The nation faced four years more of administration certain to be free from disturbing efforts to change existing conditions.

William McKinley's policy had brought prosperity and his re-election had insured it. But McKinley had been removed from his high place by the malice and ignorance and stupidity of anarchism, and Theodore Roosevelt came to administer the affairs of the nation in his stead.

Theodore Roosevelt was not a stranger to the people. They knew him well, they thought. They had known him and admired him for his rugged honesty, his tireless energy, his masterful hand in public administration, and his hatred of unfaithfulness in office.

The people had seen Theodore Roosevelt when he was fighting his way on the plains of the great West. They had had a foresight of his vigor and executive ability while he was a police commissioner in New York. They had learned his devotion to principle when he was a civil service commissioner. They had studied him while he had served them as assistant secretary of the navy, and again a leader of a regiment at the heights of San Juan hill in

CHAUNCEY M. DEPEW,
Senator from New York.

the Santiago campaign. They had watched and admired his vigorous administration while he was governor of New York. His dignity while he presided over the senate, during the brief period that he held the vice-presidential office, had impressed them.

Thus endowed with the respect, the love and the confidence of the people Theodore Roosevelt stood in the quiet parlor of the Buffalo mansion and took the oath of office which made him president. A minute later he had said:

"In the hour of deep and terrible national bereavement I wish to state it shall be my intention and endeavor to continue absolutely unbroken the policy of President McKinley, for the peace and prosperity and honor of our beloved country."

The nation had expected the declaration and it was not disappointed; and the people knew that what Theodore Roosevelt had promised, Theodore Roosevelt would do.

It is not the purpose here to present a biography of Theodore Roosevelt. It will be sufficient to indicate his career in broad lines; merely to show the man as he is and as he has been. His life has been like an open page of a familiar book, for he has been before the public for twenty years, and if there is a flaw in his character the people would have detected it long ago.

In 1884 Theodore Roosevelt became a figure in national politics for the first time. In that year he was one of the New York delegates to the Republican national convention, when he was 26 years old. He took an active part in the debates and was accorded a front place in the New York delegation.

From 1889 until 1895 Theodore Roosevelt was a member of the National Civil Service Commission. He was appointed by President Harrison and continued in the office by President Cleveland. His reports while a member of that commission gave early indication of the character of the man who was afterwards to hold the high-

est office in the gift of the nation. And it is to be noted that Theodore Roosevelt as civil service commissioner never said or wrote a thing that Theodore Roosevelt as president did not live up to. He has lived to prove his own sincerity.

In 1895 Theodore Roosevelt, Frederick D. Grant and Andrew D. Parker were appointed police commissioners of New York City. When the board was organized Mr. Roosevelt was chosen as its president. It was as a member of the police board that New York first, and the entire nation soon afterwards, came to learn what manner of man Theodore Roosevelt was. It is history that this commission revolutionized the police force of New York City and also it revolutionized the methods of enforcing the law. When Roosevelt became president of the board of police commissioners 26 policemen, including one inspector and five captains, were under indictments for crime. The new board introduced drastic reforms—so drastic that in two months 355 policemen, including one chief, three in-

spectors, eleven captains and eleven sergeants were removed for cause. Their places were filled by new men who were encouraged to do their duty by a system of honorary rewards.

It had long been declared that the excise laws of New York City could not be enforced. Theodore Roosevelt proved that they could be. He enforced the law with rigid equity to all alike. The rich saloonkeeper found that his "political pull" was useless. In the first year of the Roosevelt regime the police made 10,000 arrests for violation of the Sunday law. Saloons, gambling resorts and disorderly houses were closed, tramp lodging houses abolished, blackmailing and the protection of vice eradicated. The result was that New York had fewer crimes and life and property were safer.

From war against vice to the war against Spain was Theodore Roosevelt's next step. In 1897 he was appointed assistant secretary of the navy, under President McKinley. It has been said that Roosevelt

won the battle of Manila in 1897, although Dewey did not actually fight it until 1898. This probably is unfair to Dewey and to Dewey's men, but it is true that it was Roosevelt's tireless energy that put Dewey's fleet in condition to engage in a naval battle upon the winning of which depended American control of the Pacific in the war with Spain.

As assistant secretary of the navy in 1897 Theodore Roosevelt believed that war with Spain could not be avoided. His counsels were not asked for and he could do nothing in the negotiations to prevent war. But as assistant secretary of the navy, working ceaselessly and silently, with all the energy of his nature he saw to it that every ship in the navy was in perfect condition for war—fully manned, armed, equipped and supplied. It was due to this tireless energy of Theodore Roosevelt, more than to any other man in the government, that when the war began the fleet was ready.

When war did begin Theodore Roosevelt left his desk to take active service. He might have had a commission as colonel of a regiment of volunteers; but he refused it. His life on the plains of the Great West had taught him where to find men who could ride, who could fight and who could stand fatigue and hardships. He organized the Rough Riders, a regiment that has since been taken as a model by every nation in Europe, and was content to serve as second in command.

Any history of the Spanish-American war will vindicate Roosevelt's judgment. The part played by the Rough Riders helped to decide the issues of the war. Roosevelt earned his promotion to the colonelcy of that now famous regiment. It was in the first fight on Cuban soil and in the last.

It was Theodore Roosevelt who moved the American army from Cuba to Montauk point, Long Island, although he did not select the latter camp. After the Santiago capitulation Gen. Shafter's army was

ordered to retire to San Luis in the interior of Cuba, where conditions were supposed to be more healthful. Colonel Roosevelt at once addressed an emphatic protest to Gen. Shafter, declaring that one-half of the American soldiers in Cuba would die of fever unless moved to the north at once. This protest was followed by the famous "round robin." It created intense indignation in the war department at Washington, but it had its effect. The army started north in three days.

Theodore Roosevelt's military career lasted less than a year. It has been succinctly epitomized by Murat Halstead as follows:

"First, he foresaw as assistant secretary of the navy, the war, and he dominated the department to prepare for it, by finding the warships, the coal, the powder and the men.

"Second, he raised a regiment of incomparable mettle and quite unconquerable.

"Third, such was his executive force and ceaseless effort, he landed his volun-

teers ahead of the regulars and headed the column that got the first baptism of blood.

"Fourth, when the foe was vanquished on sea and land, the war over, he took the ships that were never before possible, using the telegraph, the steamboat, the railroad, the cables under the sea, and lifted an army ready to perish from jungles rank with fever, and wafted them to a land of health, saving thousands of lives. The people rejoiced in the man, commended and celebrated the hero, and elected him when there was peace with honor governor of the State of New York."

It is a matter of political history that Roosevelt objected with all the strenuousness of his nature to the proposal to place his name on the national ticket in second place, in 1900. He yielded only when it became apparent to him that his party's wish was practically unanimous. It is an open secret that had McKinley been at the end of his second term in 1900, instead of his first, that Roosevelt would have been nominated for president, almost by accla-

mation. The people were for him. They had not forgotten that heroic dash up the heights of San Juan, led by a man who preferred to fight for his country's honor, rather than to plan in safety for his country's success.

The party leaders had their way and Roosevelt, with quiet dignity, accepted the second place on the ticket. He went into the campaign with the same vim and daring that carried him through the war in Cuba. His party won and he settled himself for four years of waiting in the quiet uneventful obscurity of the vice-president's office. He presided over the deliberative sessions of the senate with a dignity worthy of the traditions of the office. No vice-president could do more.

The tragedy at Buffalo brought Roosevelt into the white light that beats upon a throne. He was the youngest man who had been called to that exalted office in the history of the republic. Without a moment's warning he was placed face to face with some of the greatest problems in

statecraft that had arisen in the century. He was called upon to rule the destinies of nearly 80,000,000 of people—to govern an empire of territory greater, stronger, richer, more powerful than the combined powers of Europe. His became the task of governing the people of the Philippines, of building up in those islands on the edge of the Asiatic continent a free and popular government. His was the duty to grapple with problems of internal administration and foreign relations—to preserve the rights of the people at home and to uphold the honor of the nation abroad.

President Roosevelt did not long keep the world in doubt as to his views on foreign and domestic policy. His first message to Congress was read by the people of the United States on December 2, 1901. It reviewed every problem with which the nation had to do. It left nothing to be guessed at. From that day forward, the powers of Europe, the people at home, the trusts, the labor unions, the financiers and the big taxpayers knew exactly where

Theodore Roosevelt stood. He left nothing to be inferred. He spoke out.

It is worth while to compare his administration with that first message. No other president has promised more, no other has done so much to carry out his pledges.

The young president's first executive declaration upon the question of the trusts and Cuban reciprocity are repeated in separate chapters elsewhere. Let us take up some other features of his message. First, most naturally, he paid tribute to the greatness and personal worth of William McKinley. Passing to a discussion of anarchy and of the danger it threatened to the free institutions of America, he said:

"Anarchy is no more an expression of 'social discontent' than picking pockets or wife beating. The anarchist, and especially the anarchist in the United States, is merely one type of criminal, more dangerous than any other, because he represents the same depravity in a greater degree. The man who advocates anarchy, directly or indirectly, in any shape or fashion, or the

man who apologizes for anarchists and their deeds, makes himself morally accessory to murder before the fact.

"The anarchist is a criminal whose perverted instincts lead him to prefer confusion and chaos to the most beneficent form of social order. His protest of concern for workingmen is outrageous in its impudent falsity; for if the political institutions of this country do not afford opportunity to every honest and intelligent son of toil, then the door of hope forever is closed against him. The anarchist everywhere is not merely the enemy of system and progress, but the deadly foe of liberty. If ever anarchy is triumphant, its triumph will last for but one red moment, to be succeeded for ages by the gloomy night of despotism.

"For the anarchist himself, whether he preaches or practices his doctrines, we need not have one particle more concern than for any ordinary murderer. He is not the victim of social or political injustice. There are no wrongs to remedy in

his case. The cause of his criminality is to be found in his own evil passions, and in the evil conduct of those who urge him on, not in any failure by others, or by the state, to do justice to him or his. He is a malefactor and nothing else. He is in no sense, in no state or way, a 'product of social conditions,' save that a highwayman is 'produced' by the fact that an unarmed man happens to have a purse. It is a travesty upon the great and holy names of liberty and freedom to be invoked in such a cause. No man or body of men preaching anarchist doctrines should be allowed at large, any more than if preaching the murder of some specified private individual. Anarchist speeches, writings, and meetings are essentially seditious and treasonable.

"I earnestly recommend to Congress that in the exercise of its wise discretion it should take into consideration the coming to this country of anarchists or persons professing hostility to all government and justifying the murder of those placed in

authority. Such individuals as those who not long ago gathered in open meeting to glorify the murder of King Humbert of Italy perpetrate a crime, and the law should insure their rigorous punishment. They and those like them should be kept out of this country; and if found here they should be promptly deported to the country whence they came; and far reaching provision should be made for the punishment of those who stay. The federal courts should be given jurisdiction over any man who kills or attempts to kill the president or any man who by the constitution or by law is in line of succession for the presidency."

This was the first recommendation made to Congress by Theodore Roosevelt. On March 3, 1903, Congress passed a law embodying most of the features recommended. The second recommendation, for the department of commerce and labor, was adopted by Congress and a new cabinet office created.

The message next discussed the labor question. President Roosevelt was outspoken in his friendship for labor. He urged laws prohibiting the competition of convict contract labor in the open market. He declared a provision should be made to enforce the eight-hour law. He opposed excessive tasks for women and children, night work, and work under insanitary conditions. He was not afraid to speak a word in behalf of organized or union labor. He said:

"The most vital problem with which this country, and for that matter the whole civilized world, has to deal is the problem which has for one side the betterment of social conditions, moral and physical, in large cities, and for another side the effort to deal with that tangle of far reaching questions which we group together when we speak of 'labor.' The chief factor in the success of each man—wage worker, farmer and capitalist alike—must ever be the sum total of his own individual qualities and abilities.

"Second only to this comes the power of acting in combination or association with others. Very great good has been and will be accomplished by associations or unions of wage workers, when managed with forethought, and when they combine insistence upon their own rights with law abiding respect for the rights of others. The display of these qualities in such bodies is a duty to the nation no less than to the associations themselves."

Regarding the tariff the president in his first official communication to Congress gave evidence of conservatism and prudent forethought. He wrote:

"There is a general acquiescence in our present tariff system as a national policy. The first requisite to our prosperity is the continuity and stability of this economic policy. Nothing could be more unwise than to disturb the business interests of the country by any general tariff change at this time. Doubt, apprehension, uncertainty are exactly what we most wish to avoid in the interest of our commercial



JOHN HAY,
Secretary of State.

and material well being. Our experience in the past has shown that sweeping revisions of the tariff are apt to produce conditions closely approaching panic in the business world.

"Yet it is not only possible, but eminently desirable, to combine with the stability of our economic system a supplementary system of reciprocal benefit and obligation with other nations. Such reciprocity is an incident and result of the firm establishment and preservation of our present economic policy. It was specially provided for in the present tariff law."

Another evidence of the president's conservatism is found in his reference to the great transportation interests of the country. He had no hesitancy in declaring that the great railway systems of the country should be held to strict accountability in their duties toward the public, but he opposed radical legislation. In urging amendments to the interstate commerce act in order to provide for the better enforcement of its provisions, he said:

"The railway is a public servant. Its rates should be just to and open to all shippers alike. The government should see to it that within its jurisdiction this is so and should provide a speedy, inexpensive and effective remedy to that end. At the same time it must not be forgotten that our railways are the arteries through which the commercial life blood of this nation flows. Nothing could be more foolish than the enactment of legislation which would unnecessarily interfere with the development and operation of these commercial agencies."

CHAPTER II.

THE SETTLEMENT OF THE COAL STRIKE.

THE settlement of the anthracite coal strike in 1902 was the first notable achievement in President Roosevelt's administration. It was the most serious labor disturbance that had menaced the prosperity of the country for a quarter of a century. It cost mine owners, miners, railroads, manufacturers and merchants $197,390,000. It continued for 154 days and was settled by President Roosevelt on a basis which compelled the mine owners to give full recognition to the rights and dignity of organized union labor, while at the same time the rights of capital were not impaired.

The greatness of the victory for union labor, the cost and seriousness of the struggle, the danger to business interests involved, and the tremendous value of the

THE TRIUMPHS OF THE

President's successful efforts to restore peace in the labor world, and at the same time to guard the prosperity of the country, make it worth while to give a brief review of the history of the strike.

The situation in the Pennsylvania anthracite field is paralleled in no other laboring community in the world. Practically the entire output of the hard coal of the United States is controlled by half a dozen men. They are:

GEORGE F BAER, President Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Company; Lehigh and Wilkesbarre Coal Company; Temple Iron Company.

E. B. THOMAS, Chairman Pennsylvania Coal Company; Hillsdale Coal and Iron Company.

W. H. TRUESDALE, President Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Company.

J. B. FOWLER, President Scranton Coal Company; Elk Hill Coal and Iron Company.

R. N. OLIPHANT, President Delaware and Hudson Company.

ALFRED WATERS, President Lehigh Valley Coal Company.

JOHN MARKLE, an independent operator.

These men are "trustees for the owners." The real owners of the anthracite

coal fields are the coal carrying railroads, the Reading, the Delaware and Lackawanna, the Ontario and Western, the Erie, and the Pennsylvania.

These companies have a monopoly in the anthracite field. They control 150,000 workingmen. They own the houses in which their miners live. They own the stores from which their miners are compelled to buy. They own the mines, they own the railroads that haul the coal to market, and by these facts are able to control the dealers, wholesale and retail, and to fix the price of anthracite coal in every city in the United States.

In 1901 the anthracite coal operators, at the urgent request of the late United States Senator M. A. Hanna, agreed to arbitrate with the miners, who were then striking for shorter hours and higher pay. As a result of that arbitration the operators agreed to pay a 10 per cent advance in wages. The men returned to work satisfied. In a few months, however, they complained that the operators, to make up for

the advance in wages, were charging more for provisions at country stores and docking the miners heavily in weighing coal.

A strike resulted. It began on May 12, 1902, and involved 183,500 men.

At first, the public took but little interest in the strike. Then the newspapers began printing a few startling facts. The public discovered first that the average miner in the employ of the hard coal railroads, was earning less than $400 a year. On President Baer's own estimate his employes received $368 a year. President Mitchell, of the United Mine Workers, declared the average pay was even less than that. He declared there were thousands of men working for 68 cents a day, and that breaker and washery boys received from 3 to 8 cents a day.

During May and June the miners contented themselves with marching in bodies through the coal region, overawing non-union men and driving them from work by hooting and jeering. There were many cases of individual assault, but as a rule

the great army of strikers kept the peace.

The operators daily assured the public that the strikers were returning to work in large numbers and that the mines would be running with full force inside of a month. They took such a rosy view of the situation that J. Pierpont Morgan departed for Europe with the information from his lieutenants that the strike was on the verge of breaking up.

July came and the miners, although fighting what seemed to be a losing battle, remained firm. The companies, despite their boasts, were unable to operate their mines.

Then the anthracite mine owners began systematic efforts to get out the troops, but the miners, well disciplined by President John Mitchell, kept the peace and the troops were not called out.

In July Senator Hanna, Bishop Potter, Archbishop Ryan and a score of men equally prominent, attempted to bring about arbitration. They failed, the operators demanding the unconditional sur-

render of their employes. The operators declared they would never arbitrate with John Mitchell or the United Mine Workers and that their employes must first return to work as individuals. Then and not until then would the anthracite operators consider the demands of the miners.

A crisis in the industrial world was at hand. The country at last realized that it was face to face with a coal famine that threatened to paralyze every industry east of the Mississippi river. The soft coal miners, all compactly organized, only waited the signal from John Mitchell to drop pick and shovel. Prices of coal went higher and higher and mills and factories all over the country began to feel the blight of the strike.

In the latter part of July and in August rioting began. Troops were sent into the disturbed district and the strike dragged along.

The situation was becoming alarming. The coal supply was running low. The people of the United States began to rise

in indignation. Hundreds of organizations petitioned the president and Congress, and governors of states, to force the operators to agree to arbitration.

By September 20 the anthracite coal supply of the United States practically was exhausted. Various expedients were adopted to force the operators to come to terms. They all failed. Five Boston men of wealth and influence brought suit to have receivers appointed for the anthracite coal companies. Their effort was abortive. The mayor of Detroit called upon the governors of states and the mayors of cities to meet in national conference at Detroit on October 9 to devise means to grapple with a situation which threatened industrial and commercial paralysis to the entire country.

At this crisis President Roosevelt asserted himself. With characteristic directness he went to the root of the trouble. He wrote a personal note to the six men who control the anthracite coal supply of the United States and requested them to

meet him at the White House on October 3. He sent a similar request to John Mitchell, president of the United Mine Workers.

It is significant of the confidence which the people of the United States have in Theodore Roosevelt that all other efforts to end the strike ended the moment it became known that he had called the coal operators to the White House. Business men and laboring men felt that he was the one man who could and who would settle the strike.

The conference was held at the White House on October 3. Those present were:

President Roosevelt.

The attorney general.

Carroll D. Wright, commissioner of labor.

President Baer of the Reading.

President Thomas of the Erie.

President Truesdale of the Lackawanna and Western.

President Fowler of the Ontario and Western.

Daniel Wilcox, vice-president of the Delaware and Hudson, representing President Oliphant.

John Markle, representing the independent coal operators.

President John Mitchell of the United Mine Workers of America.

Thomas Duffy, T. D. Nichols and John Fahy, presidents of Districts Numbers 7, 1 and 9 of the miners' union, being the districts where anthracite coal is mined.

At this first conference the operators were respectful, but no more. They maintained the same defiant, unyielding attitude they had shown to Senator Hanna, Bishop Potter, Archbishop Ryan, Gov. Odell and others who had endeavored to induce them to consent to submit their differences with the miners to arbitration.

When the conference opened President Roosevelt made the following statement:

"I wish to call your attention to the fact that there are three parties affected by the situation in the anthracite trade—the operators, the miners, and the general public.

I speak for neither the operators nor the miners, but for the general public. The questions at issue which led to the situation affect immediately the parties concerned—the operators and the miners. But the situation itself vitally affects the public.

"As long as there seemed to be reasonable hope that these matters could be adjusted between the parties it did not seem proper for me to intervene in any way. I disclaim any right or duty to intervene in this way upon legal grounds or upon any official relation that I bear to the situation; but the urgency and the terrible nature of the catastrophe impending over a large portion of our people in the shape of a winter fuel famine, impel me, after much anxious thought, to believe that my duty requires me to use whatever influence I personally can to bring to an end a situation which has become literally intolerable.

"The evil possibilities are so far reaching that it seems to me that you are not only justified in sinking, but required to sink, for the time being any tenacity to

your respective claims in the matter at issue between you.

"In my judgment the situation imperatively requires that you meet upon the common plane of the necessities of the public. With all the earnestness there is in me I ask that there be an immediate resumption of operation in the coal mines, in some such way as will without a day's unnecessary delay meet the crying needs of the people.

"I do not invite a discussion of your respective claims and positions. I appeal to your patriotism, to the spirit that sinks personal considerations and makes individual sacrifices to the general good."

The anthracite operators almost arrogantly refused to meet President Roosevelt's appeal. They refused to arbitrate. They practically demanded federal troops to overawe the strikers in order that they might work their mines as they pleased, pay what wages they pleased and charge what price they pleased.

President Baer told President Roosevelt that he should not "waste time negotiating with the fomenters of this anarchy and insolent defiance of law," but that he should "do as was done in the war of the rebellion, restore the majesty of the law and re-establish peace at any price."

E. B. Thomas, president of the Erie, told President Roosevelt that mob violence alone prevented resumption of work in the mines.

John Markle declared it was President Roosevelt's first duty to send federal troops into the coal fields. He said:

"I now ask you to perform the duties vested in you as president of the United States to at once squelch the anarchistic condition of affairs existing in the anthracite coal regions by the strong arm of the military at your command. If you desire anthracite coal to be placed in the market quickly, take the necessary steps at once and put federal troops in the field."

W. H. Truesdale, president of the Lackawanna, declared that the "suppression of

anarchy'' must be the first step toward peace.

David Wilcox, president of the Delaware and Hudson, called the miners' union a monopoly and declared they were plotting to gain control of the entire coal supply of the country.

In strong contrast to these demands was the simple proposal of John Mitchell, president of the United Mine Workers. He said:

''We propose that the issues in this strike be referred to you and a tribunal of your own selection, and agree to accept your award upon all or any of the questions involved.''

No greater tribute to the personal worth of Theodore Roosevelt was ever paid by any man. Here was the representative of nearly half a million laboring men, who had suffered and whose families had suffered for months, who were engaged in a life and death struggle with a combination of corporate interests, capitalized at $500,000,000, willing to rest their whole

case upon the decision of the man who sat in the White House and to abide by that decision for any term of years the coal operators might demand.

There were no reservations, no conditions. The miners in effect said to Theodore Roosevelt:

"You decide our case. We will accept your decision in advance."

The operators refused to accept the arbitration of the President and exposed the weakness of their whole case.

The anthracite owners tried to face public opinion and failed. Every way they turned they found sentiment against them. They had left the White House on October 3, satisfied that they had taught Theodore Roosevelt a lesson in government. They returned to the White House on October 13 in a different spirit. They had stood for ten days in the fierce light that beat down upon them from an aroused and indignant public and they could not hold out against it.

W. H. MOODY,
Secretary of the Navy.

On the night of October 13 J. Pierpont Morgan appeared at the White House at the request of the anthracite operators. In their behalf and at their request the New York financier asked President Roosevelt to name an arbitration commission. The request was in writing and was signed by the anthracite operators.

President Roosevelt named the arbitration commission on October 15. It was made up as follows:

BRIG. GEN. JOHN M. NELSON, U. S. A., an officer of the engineer corps.

E. W. PARKER, an expert mining engineer, and chief statistician of the coal division of the United States geological survey.

GEORGE GRAY, judge of the United States court, former senator from Delaware; member of the Spanish peace commission; member of international committee of arbitration under The Hague convention.

JOHN LANCASTER SPAULDING, Catholic Bishop of Peoria.

EDGAR E. CLARK, grand chief of the Order of Railway Conductors.

THOMAS H. WATKINS, of Scranton, Pa., acquainted with mining and selling of coal.

CARROL D. WRIGHT, United States commissioner of labor.

The appointment of the commission ended the strike. The miners returned to work, just as John Mitchell said they would. The idle mines were again in full operation. All fear of a coal famine vanished. Manufacturing industry revived at once, and prosperity, threatened for months, continued. The courage of Theodore Roosevelt and the implicit confidence placed in him by the laboring men of the country averted a great industrial crisis.

The press of the United States did not hesitate to give President Roosevelt the credit. Labor leaders were equally prompt in declaring that the president had shown himself, not only the friend of the workingman, but of the union workingman.

Ultimately the arbitration commission gave its decision. It sustained most of the demands of the miners' union. It gave them increased wages. It justified the confidence placed in President Roosevelt by the miners themselves. No greater tribute could be paid to him as a President and as a man.

CHAPTER III.

THE VENEZUELAN AFFAIR.

THE delicate diplomatic negotiations over the Venezuelan affair, in 1892-1893, began even while President Roosevelt was engrossed in the settlement of the anthracite coal strike. Thus it happened that while he was protecting the rights and interests of the humblest laborers at home he was securing from the great powers of Europe a broader and more cordial recognition of the rights and interests of the nation.

The issues involved in the quarrel between Great Britain, Germany and Italy on the one hand and the turbulent little South American republic on the other trenched dangerously close to an attack upon the Monroe doctrine and a dispute with the United States. A diplomatic situation was created which required delicate handling and at the same time an unfalter-

ing courage. President Roosevelt proved himself equal to the occasion.

It is fair to state that when Great Britain, and Germany, in their efforts to collect debts due their citizens from Venezuela, were forced to make actual war upon that republic, they had no purpose in attacking or undermining the Monroe doctrine. The record on this point is clear, and, had not the unexpected attitude of Venezuela precipitated a crisis it is likely that the United States would not have been involved in the controversy.

Yet, as events turned out, a real and serious menace to the Monroe doctrine developed. Great Britain and Germany expected to be compelled to undertake nothing more than the seizure of one or two custom houses, to be held only until the duties collected on imports would equal the amount of their claims against Venezuela. To this procedure President Roosevelt would have offered no objection. He had secured pledges, oral and written, from both powers, that the occupation of the Venezuelan

customs houses would be only temporary.

The situation, however, developed along different and unexpected lines. Great Britain and Germany found themselves face to face with the necessity of sending armies to Venezuela—armies of sufficient strength to march across rugged mountains and to capture an inland capital guarded by 200,000 men.

President Roosevelt refused to permit so serious a campaign by the armies of foreign powers on the soil of an American republic. He took the position that a war of such magnitude would have proved so costly an enterprise that the nations involved in it might be compelled in sheer self-protection to occupy the territory of Venezuela for an indefinite period. The President declined to permit the history of Egypt to be repeated on American soil. The inner history of the diplomatic exchanges which compelled the powers to give up the campaign is yet to be written. Diplomacy does not work on the street corners or on the housetops. It is only known

that Great Britain and Germany began war on Venezuela unexpectedly and stopped it as suddenly as it began. It is known that Admiral Dewey, with the most powerful squadron of battleships and cruisers that ever assembled in the Caribbean sea left the winter rendezvous off Culebra island, east of Porto Rico, and proceeded to the Island of Trinidad, within a few hours' steaming distance of the Venezuelan ports held under the menace of British and German guns. It is known that the allied fleets proclaimed a blockade and bombarded a few Venezuelan ports and then settled the main points of the controversy by agreement at Washington and submitted other points to the international tribunal at The Hague.

It is not to be denied that no little uneasiness was manifested in the United States over the Venezuelan affairs. Newspapers and public speakers who took a superficial view of the incident asserted that the European powers had deliberately planned an attack upon the Monroe doctrine. The

facts do not justify this view. Great Britian has never been seriously disposed to challenge the Monroe doctrine, and its government in recent years has repeatedly announced in state papers and in formal declaration in Parliament that it recognizes the full force of the principle. The attitude of the German government always has been strictly correct.

And yet the situation undeniably lent itself to an attack upon the Monroe doctrine. Venezuela owed large sums of money, not only to Germany, Italy and Great Britain, but to France, Belgium, Spain, Norway, Sweden and The Netherlands. Never had so great an opportunity presented itself for the nations of Europe to make just and common cause against an American republic, despite the restraints of the Monroe doctrine, and to unite in seizing and holding American soil.

Fortunately President Roosevelt was a man quick to realize the opportunity that had presented itself to Europe. He was equally quick to see the menace to the Mon-

roe doctrine implied. He was equally prompt to take energetic measures to uphold the American principle.

A careful examination of the facts leads to the suspicion that Germany deliberately forced a quarrel upon Venezuela. For years that South American republic had been rent by revolution and civil war. It had defaulted in its interest due on the foreign loan, and it confronted an enormous aggregate of claims from German, English, French and other foreign citizens for property lost during the civil wars. When President Castro restored peace in 1895 he took up the settlement of these foreign claims. France presented claims for $10,800,000, Germany for $2,140,000, and Italy for $67,000. The claims made by citizens of other nationalities were indefinite.

Venezuela had no difficulty in reaching a settlement with her largest creditor, France. A treaty of commerce and navigation was signed and all the French claims referred to the arbitration of Senor Leon y Castillo, the Spanish ambassador at Paris,

who was to act with one representative of France and one of Venezuela. On April 18, 1902, France and Venezuela signed a protocol accepting the decision of the arbitrator, and the payment of a debt of $10,800,000 arranged for without friction, without threats and without a display of naval force, the bombardment of seaports and the killing of innocent men and women.

German claims amounted to only $2,140,000. President Castro ordered the submission of these claims to a Venezuelan commission for examination. The claims were for alleged damage to the property of German citizens by the armies of the various revolutionary outbreaks, for goods supplied to the troops, from requisitions made in war time, looting and forced loans. Many of them were extravagantly exorbitant. Many of them were based on mere assertions.

On January 24, 1901, the Venezuelan government ordered the claims referred to a commission, with right of appeal to the Venezuelan supreme court. Germany re-

fused to abide by this arrangement, examined the claims herself, and peremptorily demanded payment.

The English claims were of a different character and involved, in addition to money claims, a dispute over the possession of the Island of Patos, off the Venezuelan coast.

On July 23, 1902, England suggested to Germany joint action to obtain satisfaction from Venezuela. Germany proposed a naval demonstration. But Germany insisted further that British and German claims should stand or fall together, that neither claim could be settled without a satisfactory settlement of the other, and that neither government should be at liberty to recede except by mutual agreement. Great Britain agreed.

No English statesman in modern times has been more severely criticised by his own people than was Lord Lansdowne, the British minister of foreign affairs, for signing such an agreement with Germany. English newspapers, when the real significance

became known, declared in so many words that Great Britain had been trapped by Germany, and that in consequence Great Britain had been compelled to assume an attitude distasteful to the people of the United States. But the agreement had been signed and England stood by her word to Germany and the preparations for a naval demonstration began.

Germany consulted the United States before acting. Ambassador Von Holleben called at the state department and assured Secretary Hay that Germany and England contemplated nothing more than the usual course of procedure. The assurances of the German ambassador were accepted as coming from a friendly power. The situation was not a new one in the history of the relations between foreign governments and the little fire-eating, debt-evading republics of South and Central America. President Cleveland had permitted the English to seize the port of Corinto, on the west coast of Nicaragua, and hold it until claims against that government had been

adjusted. In so doing President Cleveland in no way endangered the Monroe doctrine, for he had been assured that British occupation of Corinto would cease the instant British claims had been adjusted.

In the Venezuelan affair Secretary Hay only followed the usual rule. He made it clear to the German ambassador that foreign occupation of a Venezuelan port, if made necessary by the exigencies of the affair, could at most be only temporary and that the United States would assume the right to judge circumstances as they developed and to interfere whenever the Monroe doctrine was in apparent danger of infringement.

Events proved that Germany and Great Britain were compelled to go beyond the assurances given to the United States. In a written memorandum left with Secretary Hay, the German ambassador, Dr. Von Holleben said:

"We declare especially that under no circumstances do we consider in our proceedings the acquisition or the permanent

occupation of Venezuelan territory. If the Venezuelan government should force us to the application of measures of coercion, we should have to consider if at this occasion we should ask likewise for a greater security for the fulfillment of the claims. After the posting of an ultimatum, first of all the blockade of the more important Venezuelan harbors would have to be considered as an appropriate measure of coercion. * * * If this measure does not seem efficient we should have to consider the temporary occupation on our part of different Venezuelan harbor places and the levying of duty in those places."

So far, so good. Germany had assured the United States of a purpose to enforce only a peaceful blockade, and in the event of that measure failing to secure a settlement, the collection of duties on goods imported into Venezuela. President Roosevelt accepted these assurances of the German government. In a memorandum handed to Ambassador Von Holleben, he wrote:

"The President of the United States, appreciating the courtesy of the German government in making him acquainted with the state of affairs referred to, and not regarding himself as called upon to enter into the consideration of the claims in question, believes that no measures will be taken in this matter by the agents of the German government which are not in accordance with the well known purpose, above set forth, of his majesty, the German Emperor."

President Roosevelt's attitude toward the foreign governments involved in the controversy with Venezuela was strictly correct. It was endorsed by such able Senators as Cullom of Illinois, and Lodge of Massachusetts. It was upheld by the press of the United States. The consensus of opinion in the United States was correctly voiced by Senator Lodge when he said:

"The attitude of the United States in reference to the question is made perfectly plain by President Roosevelt in his message. Under the Monroe doctrine this gov-

ernment is permitted to intervene only to the extent of preventing acquisition of territory. The United States may keep a watchful eye on the course pursued by these foreign powers and see that there is no overstepping of the provisions named. Beyond that, the United States has no interest in the forcible collection of the Venezuelan debt."

But in spite of England and Germany's assurances of a pacific blockade and peaceful coercion, events moved so rapidly on the Venezuelan coast that within a week after the policy of "peaceful coercion" was put in force by the allied fleets, both Germany and Great Britain were engaged in actual war with Venezuela and the whole face of the controversy was altered.

Germany and England miscalculated the strength of Venezuelan patriotism and the extent of Venezuelan courage. They had taken it for granted that Venezuela would tamely submit to the inevitable settlement under the frowning menace of the shotted guns of a formidable fleet.

But Venezuela did not submit tamely. Germany and England presented ultimatums at Caracas on December 7, and withdrew their envoys. The effect was unexpected and startling. President Castro defied the powers and the people of Venezuela, regardless of revolutionary plots and party quarrels, rallied to his support.

Events moved with startling rapidity, and in three days Germany and England, instead of conducting a peaceful blockade of the Venezuelan coast, were making actual war on an American republic.

Venezuelan warships were seized and scuttled. Venezuelan ports were bombarded and non-combatants killed. President Castro called 250,000 men to arms and began to fortify his seaports. He seized the German railroad from La Guayra to Caracas and made preparations to defend his capital.

President Roosevelt instantly recognized the seriousness of the danger involved in the startling change in the situation. He saw, more quickly than any other states-



LESLIE M. SHAW,
Secretary of the Treasury.

man in America or Europe, that unless Germany and England were restrained they would be compelled to land an army in Venezuela, to seize the capital and to hold it until Venezuela made a satisfactory settlement. Such a course involved indefinite occupation of the territory of an American republic by a foreign power, and as such was a direct and flagrant violation of the letter and spirit of the Monroe doctrine.

With President Roosevelt, to realize quickly was to act quickly. On the night of December 14, the ambassadors of Germany and Great Britain were handed memorandums to the effect:

"It must be understood that the United States could not give its consent to any extension of the international right of peaceful blockade."

In other words, Germany and Great Britain were informed that the United States would not permit them to punish Venezuela, nor would they be permitted to

go beyond the limits of a peaceful blockade.

President Roosevelt had given the Monroe doctrine a new and broader interpretation. He recognized the right of all nations to collect debts justly due from American republics, but he declared plainly that European powers could not make war upon an American republic without the consent of the United States.

The President's plain warning compelled the allies to abandon their campaign against Venezuela. There was no more talk of seizing ports and customs houses. All ideas of sending German and English soldiers to occupy the territory of the South American republic were given up.

More than that, the President's prompt decision nearly caused a rupture of friendly relations between England and Germany. English press and public declared that England had been led blindly by Germany. The debates in the British House of Commons and the merciless criticism of the London press proved that Premier Bal-

four and Lord Lansdowne had been made the unwitting victims of Germany's superior diplomacy. President Roosevelt's startling warning showed British statesmen where their government stood.

England's reply came without an instant's hesitation. On December 16, two days after the British ambassador in London had been informed that the United States could not permit the powers to go beyond the limits of a peaceful blockade of the Venezuelan coast, the British house rang with cheers when Lord Cranborne under secretary of state for foreign affairs, declared that Great Britain would assist in upholding and maintaining the Monroe doctrine.

From that day forward the Venezuelan adventure was doomed to failure. England would have no more of it. True, England held to her agreement with Germany to the extent of keeping her fleet in Venezuelan waters, but the British ships contented themselves with maintaining a strictly peaceful blockade, waiting for Germany

and Italy to agree to proposals to submit the entire dispute to arbitration.

At Rome no secret was made of the belief that Italy was participating in the first European attack upon the Monroe doctrine. Press comment and parliamentary debate proved the satisfaction and pride of the Italian people in the part their government was taking in the first organized effort by the powers in breaking down the barrier to European acquisition of territory on the American continent.

Germany did not realize that the game was lost until four days had followed President Roosevelt's warning. In those four days Germany awakened to public sentiment in the United States. American correspondents of leading German newspapers cabled circumstantial reports of anti-German feeling in the big republic. One New York correspondent declared that Germany seemingly was without a friend in the United States. Others declared that Germany was accused of designs to secure

territory in Venezuela in defiance of the Monroe doctrine.

These statements produced a feeling of profound astonishment in German official and business circles. This feeling resulted in a general protest that Germany cared more for friendly relations with the United States than it did for the satisfaction of humiliating even so insolent a state as Venezuela. The revulsion of sentiment was quickly felt at the foreign office and Germany reluctantly agreed to submit the Venezuelan affair to arbitration.

President Roosevelt had saved the situation. He had protected the Monroe doctrine, even to the extent of sending Admiral Dewey with practically the entire effective naval strength of the United States to Trinidad within a few hours' steaming of the blockaded Venezuelan coast.

Diplomatically, Germany's assurances of respect for the Monroe doctrine were strictly correct. The United States was assured all along that Germany had no designs upon Venezuelan territory. Presi-

dent Roosevelt had accepted these assurances as having been made in perfect good faith.

But there was a grave danger to the Monroe doctrine that even the diplomatic assurances of Germany could not avert. Venezuela's temper had been aroused to the fighting point. Once embarked in a land campaign, Germany and England could have conquered Venezuela only by landing from 50,000 to 150,000 men—Venezuela had called 250,000 men to arms. The campaign in the mountains of Venezuela would have consumed months and have cost several hundred millions of dollars.

How were Germany and England to be indemnified for so tremendous an expenditure? Under the terms of their assurances to the United States they could recoup themselves only by the indefinite occupation of Venezuelan soil and the indefinite collection of duties on imports at Venezuelan harbors.

England's occupation of Egypt affords too striking an object lesson to be overlooked even by a man less skilled in statesmanship than Theodore Roosevelt.

The story of the final settlement of the Venezuelan controversy need not be told here. Suffice it to say that it was settled by negotiation at Washington and by reference to The Hague.

President Roosevelt's conduct of the affair enabled the United States as well as Europe to take their first measure of his genius as a statesman. It was the first great international crisis with which he had to deal. He met it with a clearness of vision, a wisdom that would have been creditable to a chancellor skilled in years of diplomacy, and with a courage that did not shrink even in the presence of the knowledge that one mistake, one deviation from the dictates of good judgment and sound policy would have involved the United States in complications that might have led to war with United Europe.

Theodore Roosevelt thus proved his statesmanship almost at the outset of his administration. The Venezuelan affair was, as events finally proved, insignificant; but for the time being it was fraught with the danger that sometimes decides the fate of empires. And when the Venezuelan incident was closed Germany and England and with them the other powers of Europe had accorded an official recognition of the Monroe doctrine they had never given before and had given it without rancor, and with the full understanding that for all time the United States was the dominant power on the new hemisphere.

CHAPTER IV.

ALASKAN BOUNDARY SETTLEMENT.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT proved the high qualities of his statesmanship by the wisdom and courage with which he settled the Venezuelan affair. His success in ending the Alaskan boundary dispute was even a greater diplomatic triumph.

Prior to 1897 the Alaskan boundary question was regarded by Canada with only a languid interest. To the statesmen at Ottawa the settlement of the controversy was only a matter of a surveying party with a chain and a few stakes. But in 1897 gold was found along the banks of Klondike creek in the British Northwest Territory, and in three months 50,000 excited prospectors rushed into the region. The Klondike gold fields promised to equal the mines of the Rand in the Transvaal. The gold was there, in immense quantities.

The United States controlled the only sea gates to the Klondike gold fields. The rush of prospectors passed through the American ports of Dyea and Skaguay at the head of Lynn canal. Those ports were in the narrow strip of territory long but indifferently claimed by Canada.

Canada's interest in the Alaskan boundary question suddenly warmed, and in less than a year after the discovery of gold in the Klondike fields the Canadian press, backed by the Canadian government, was declaring, vehemently and persistently, that the ports of Dyea and Skaguay belonged to Canada.

Canada's claims were received in the United States with smiles of incredulity and were promptly characterized as absurd. But the Canadians were frantically in earnest. They threatened embargoes on American goods and retaliation on American tariffs. They ordered a heavy tax on all gold taken from Klondike claims by American miners. Some of the more excitable even indulged in noisy talk of war.

More than once in the history of the last 100 years have the United States and Great Britain been brought to the verge of war by disputes over the boundary line between British and American possessions in the North American continent. One of the most tedious and interesting disputes between the United States and Great Britain came over the boundary from the St. Croix river along the Maine-New York frontier to the St. Lawrence. A commission tried to settle the dispute and failed. Then it was referred to the arbitration of the King of The Netherlands. Both countries rejected his decision and the quarrel was renewed with greater intensity of feeling than ever. Then a modus-vivendi established a temporary boundary line which was ignored by the people on both sides.

The border warfare which followed brought the United States and Great Britain so close to war that congress authorized the President to call out the militia and voted $10,000,000 for national defense. General Winfield Scott, commander-in-

chief of the army, was sent to the frontier, and war was all but declared. Happily, however, General Scott had been trained in the rough diplomacy of war and he was able to arrange a temporary truce which led, after some further delays, to a permanent treaty, signed in 1842.

Again, the boundary from the Rocky mountains to the Pacific nearly brought the countries into war. The United States claimed the whole territory along the Pacific from California to the Russian possessions, at 54 degrees 40 minutes, and in the national campaign in 1844, "Fifty-four forty or fight," was the watchword. President Polk was elected on this issue, but his secretary of state, James Buchanan, signed a treaty with the British minister, yielding all of British Columbia to Great Britain, although American rights to the whole territory had been declared to be unquestionable by the democratic national convention and by a democratic president.

In 1859 the United States again had to face the possibility of war over the pos-

session of San Juan island, near Vancouver, and again General Winfield Scott was to settle the dispute, without war if possible, but with war if necessary. Again the bluff soldier arranged a truce, which continued until 1871, when the decision of the Emperor of Germany, to whom the dispute had been referred, gave San Juan island to the United States.

Therefore, Canada's threats of war over the Alaskan boundary, while never regarded seriously in the United States, or, for that matter in Great Britain, proved that irritation sufficient for a serious quarrel existed.

Canada insisted on submitting the Alaskan boundary to an arbitration tribunal. This was natural enough, perhaps, for Canada had nothing to lose. But the American people, without party distinction, opposed arbitration. The United States had been in peaceful and practically undisputed possession of the territory since 1867. Prior to that year Russia had held undisputed possession since 1825. Why should

the United States arbitrate over the possession of her own territory?

But Canada was terribly in earnest. There were only two ways of reaching the Klondike—one by the Yukon river, which was open only during a short time during the summer, and the other by the Lynn canal and a long portage across the mountains. The Yukon route was entirely within American territory until the edge of the Klondike gold field was reached. Miners going by the Lynn canal and starting from Dyea or Skaguay passed over American territory until they reached the summit of the mountains, where they reached the Canadian line and became subject to Canadian tariffs and Canadian laws. The Klondike region could not successfully be approached wholly on British territory. The trail from the inhabited portions of British Columbia was long and terrible, and most of the hardy Canadian prospectors who tried it died on the way.

It was evident, therefore, that while the British government actually owned the

Klondike gold field it could not get to it except by passing through territory owned by the United States. British mining supplies would have to be brought into the United States, pay duties at Dyea or Skaguay and then be taken back into British territory. This gave the United States control of the food question and the food question controlled the Klondike gold fields.

It became absolutely necessary for the Canadians to find a gateway to the sea without striking a custom house flying the American flag. Therefore Canadians began to study the maps of Alaska, and to look up the treaties covering the various transfers of Alaska.

As a result of their hasty study the Canadians claimed that the American ports of Dyea and Skaguay were on British soil.

The preposterous claim advanced so unexpectedly by Canada necessarily leads to a brief review of the several treaties covering the sea frontier of Alaska.

In 1821 a Russian ukase asserted a claim to exclusive jurisdiction of a tract of ocean

100 miles from the mainland of Northeastern Asia, and a similar distance from the northwest coast of North America, which long had been occupied by Russian fur traders. In addition Russia asserted that its strip of coast, now known as the Alaska pan handle, ran down among the fringe of islands of the fifty-first parallel, north latitude. This claim deprived British Columbia of access to the Pacific ocean.

Right here is a point which has frequently been overlooked in all discussion of the Alaskan boundary dispute. Russia's claim of 1821 brought that empire into dispute with the United States, which at that time claimed that the territory of Oregon extended along the Pacific coast north to the 55th degree of north latitude. Russia, therefore, claimed 250 miles of coast also claimed by the United States. The United States promptly protested, and as Russia was not in position to back up her extravagant claim she signed a treaty with the United States in 1824, withdrawing all

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Postmaster-General.

claims to the Pacific coast south of the fifty-fifth parallel of latitude.

In the following year, 1825, Russia and the United States signed a treaty determining the boundary between Russian possessions in Alaska and the British Northwest territory. This treaty defined the boundaries of the territory sold by Russia to the United States in 1867.

On the surface this treaty was so plain that no one not seeking a basis for an unjust quarrel would hardly misinterpret it. The boundary remained without dispute from 1825 until 1898. Under the treaty of 1825, the boundary line ran from the southernmost point of Prince of Wales island, north along Portland Channel to the fifty-sixth degree of north latitude, then northward, following the summits of the mountains parallel to the coast. It was expressly stated that wherever the summits of the mountains shall prove to be at a distance of more than ten marine leagues from the ocean the line should be formed by a line parallel to the windings

(sinuosities) of the coast, never exceeding the distance of ten marine leagues therefrom. This was the boundary agreed upon by Russia and the United States when the latter purchased Alaska in 1867.

In 1898 the Canadians suddenly discovered that the treaty did not mean what it said. They asserted that whereas the treaty said "Portland Channel," it meant "Behm Channel," and that where the treaty referred to the windings of the coast it did not mean "coast," but islands. This was the only basis for the claims made so excitedly by Canada after gold had been discovered in the Klondike. But Canada was hunting for a tide water port.

Thus the dispute began. Canada first insisted that the thirty-mile strip should be measured from the outside (western) line of the string of islands that fringes the Alaskan pan handle. This, of course, would have deprived the United States of practically the Alaskan mainland south of Mount St. Elias. It would have moved

Dyea, Skaguay, Juneau and other principal ports into British territory.

This claim was so absurdly extravagant that it was laughed out of court. Canada was forced by sheer ridicule to drop it.

Then the persistent Canadians, with their eyes still fixed on the coveted ports of Dyea and Skaguay, advanced a new claim. A glance at a map of Alaska shows that the Alaska pan handle is intersected by numerous great bays. Although all geographers and statesmen conceded that the ocean boundary followed the windings of the coast, because the treaty specifically so declared, the Canadian geographers of the new school advanced the claim that the great bays on the Alaskan coast should be disregarded, and that the "general coast line" should be assumed to jump from headland to headland.

It was upon this adroit bit of geographical quibbling that Canada proposed to base a suit before a court of arbitration. The United States naturally refused. President Roosevelt refused to submit claims to

territory so long held by the United States in undisputed possession to the final decision of a tribunal which would have called in a foreign empire.

Canada having everything to gain and nothing to lose, persisted in her demands for arbitration. President Roosevelt as persistently refused. Finally Canada suggested a compromise.

"You keep Dyea and Skaguay and give us Pyramid harbor," said the Canadians.

This was very much as if the United States had laid claim to the south coast of England and offering to compromise by suggesting that England keep Portsmouth and Plymouth, but give Southampton to the United States.

Finally, President Roosevelt, in the negotiations with the British ambassador at Washington, stated his willingness to submit the controversy to a tribunal of six men—three to be named by the United States and the other three by the British government. If the six men could reach a decision the President was willing to abide

by it; but he would not consent to the selection of a seventh man as umpire.

President Roosevelt's proposal was received with a storm of indignation in Canada, and with a feeling of uneasiness in the United States. In this country a large number of citizens—possibly a majority—were opposed to arbitration in any form. But even their opposition to arbitration did not shake the people's faith in the President, and as later developments proved, their confidence was not misplaced.

The British ambassador accepted President Roosevelt's proposal and a formal treaty was signed. The senate ratified the treaty. The President lost no time in putting the treaty into effect. With hardly any delay he named as the American members of the commission Elihu Root of New York, secretary of war; Henry Cabot Lodge, senator of the United States from Massachusetts, and George Turner, late senator of the United States from the state of Washington.

The Canadian government objected to the personnel of the American commission, complaining to the British colonial office that the men named by the President were not "impartial jurists of repute," as contemplated by the treaty. The British government, however, did not regard the Canadian complaint as serious.

There was some criticism of the commission in the United States, the assertion being made that President Roosevelt should have named judges of the supreme court. It is due to the President to state, however, that he offered a place on the commission to two justices of the supreme court. One declined, it is understood, on the ground that he did not regard the post as in the line of his duty. The other gave a similar reason.

The British government named as its members of the commission, Baron Alverstone, lord chief justice of England; Sir Louis A. Jette, lieutenant governor of Quebec, and Judge John D. Armour, judge of the supreme court of Canada. Judge Ar-

mour died soon after his appointment and the vacancy was filled by A. B. Aylesworth, a prominent member of the Toronto bar.

Details of the deliberations of the tribunal need not be given here. The joint commission held its first session in London on September 3, 1903. The vast masses of documentary evidence accumulated on both sides had already been placed in the tribunal's hands. The oral arguments began on September 12, and continued for eighteen days, with few intermissions. The tribunal went into secret session on October 8, and on October 20 its decision was delivered to the officers of the respective governments. Lord Alverstone united with the three American commissioners in declaring that the boundary line always claimed by the United States was correct. The two Canadian commissioners refused to sign the decision, but it was gracefully, if not cheerfully, accepted by the Canadian government.

The result of the Alaskan boundary arbitration has been declared to be the great-

est diplomatic victory won by the United States within the present generation, and historians both in the United States and Great Britain unite in giving the credit to President Roosevelt, who had the courage to submit the question to the award of a judicial tribunal. It is but fair to say that the President in agreeing to arbitrate did so against the best judgment of many of the wisest men in the nation. But he knew the claims of the United States were just, right and unassailable in any court of justice. He realized, too, that the question would be a constant irritant between the United States and Canada as long as it remained unsettled. With his characteristic courage and willingness to assume risks in order to demonstrate fair play he resolved to settle a vexatious dispute for all time to come, and he did.

CHAPTER V.

RECIPROCITY FOR CUBA.

WHILE he was engrossed with the perplexing details of the negotiations over the settlement of the Venezuelan affair President Roosevelt never for an instant relaxed his efforts to secure for the new Cuban republic those commercial advantages which virtually had been pledged to her by the United States. From the very beginning of his administration he contended that the honor of the nation was involved in the granting of a reciprocity treaty to Cuba. In insisting upon this his purpose ran counter to the opinions of many leading men in his own party; but even the opposition of republican leaders and republican newspapers failed to move him from his high conception of national honor. A man less courageous would have shrunk from so formidable an opposition within the ranks of his own party. But

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the President was persistent without being obstinate. He neither coaxed, cajoled nor threatened. He simply pointed to congress again and again the path along which its obvious duty lay.

And he won. His victory was all the greater by reason of the fact that it was won by the aid of his party and without laying the foundation for party differences. He won with the approval of his party, of the press and of the people.

The story of President Roosevelt's victory for national honor forms one of the most interesting chapters in the history of his first administration. In his first message to congress written within three months after he had succeeded to the presidency, he urged a Cuban reciprocity measure. He said:

"In the case of Cuba there are weighty reasons of morality and of national interest why the policy (of reciprocity) should be held to have a peculiar application, and I most earnestly ask your attention to the wisdom, indeed, to the vital need, of pro-

viding for a substantial reduction in the tariff duties on Cuban imports into the United States. Cuba has, in her constitution, affirmed what we desired, and we are bound by every consideration of honor and expediency to pass commercial measures in the interest of her material welfare."

Congress took up the question of Cuban reciprocity with neither alacrity nor enthusiasm. The ways and means committee framed a bill granting a tariff reduction of 20 per cent. on all Cuban imports, on condition that the Cuban government adopt the immigration and contract labor laws of the United States. The republican majority in the committee did not act in harmony, and it was reported to the house through the votes of some of the democratic minority members.

A strong republican opposition to the bill developed in congress. The source of the opposition, it was soon discovered, was in the beet sugar growing interests of Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Colorado, Utah and California.

The republican opponents of Cuban reciprocity—and they represented in the main the beet sugar growing states—raised the cry that the reciprocity proposal would benefit the sugar trust. The charge afterward was proven to be without foundation, but it served its purpose. Long before the congressional session of the spring of 1902 was ready to adjourn it was evident to the republicans who had stood by President Roosevelt in his plea for the fulfillment of the implied pledges of the United States to Cuba, that the bill reported from the ways and means committee could not be passed. The President reluctantly decided to abandon the effort. The President did not propose to abandon his fight for Cuban reciprocity. He determined to secure it by another method—by the negotiation of a reciprocity treaty with Cuba.

Before congress adjourned, however, President Roosevelt sent in a special message on the subject. In it he reviewed the pledges made to Cuba and the efforts made by President McKinley to carry out

the compact with the new republic. The message was sent to congress on June 13, and in it the President said in part:

"Some of our citizens oppose the lowering of the tariff on Cuban products, just as three years ago they opposed the admission of the Hawaiian Islands, lest free trade with them might ruin certain of our interests here. In the actual event their fears proved baseless. Their apprehension as to the damage to any industry of our own because of the proposed measure of reciprocity with Cuba seems to me equally baseless. In my judgment no American industry will be hurt, and many American industries will be benefited by the proposed action. It is to our advantage as a nation that the growing Cuban market should be controlled by the American producers.

* * *

"We are a wealthy and powerful nation; Cuba is a young republic, still weak, who owes to us her birth, whose future, whose very life, must depend upon our attitude toward her. I ask that we help her as she

struggles along the painful and difficult road of self-governing independence. I ask this aid for her because she is weak, because she needs it, because we have already aided her. I ask that open-handed help, of a kind which a self-respecting people can accept, be given to Cuba, for the very reason that we have given her such help in the past.

"Our soldiers fought to give her freedom; and for three years our representatives, civil and military, have toiled unceasingly, facing disease of a peculiarly sinister and fatal type, with patient and uncomplaining fortitude, to teach her how to use aright her new freedom. Never in history has any alien country been thus administered with such high integrity of purpose, such wise judgment, and such single-minded devotion. Now I ask that the Cubans be given all possible chance to use the freedom which Americans have such right to be proud of, and for which so many American lives have been sacrificed."

The President's message was sent to congress with the knowledge that its plea for Cuba would fail. He knew that congress had rejected his proposed policy; and yet there was no trace of resentment, no hint of disappointment, no tinge of bitterness.

Congress adjourned and the President faced a delicate party situation. He felt that he was right. He believed that the people of the United States upheld his policy. A less greater man would have sought to force an unwelcome policy upon congress by cajolery, by pressure, by threat of withholding patronage. Theodore Roosevelt was not such a man. Through all the trying period in which he faced a majority in congress hostile to his policy he maintained the correct attitude of an executive of a republic in which the people's representatives make laws or refuse to make laws, according to the dictates of their best judgment.

Confident in the fairness and justice of his policy, the President appealed to the people, and subsequent events proved that

his confidence was not misplaced. Republican state conventions in practically every state in the Union upheld his policy. There were a few exceptions where state interests seemed to be menaced by the proposal to admit Cuban products into the United States at lower rates of duty.

The republicans of Connecticut, at Hartford, on September 17, commended the administration of President Roosevelt, and even at that early date, favored his renomination, saying:

"Especially we commend the President's efforts to perform a plain duty and obtain for this country a lucrative commerce by arranging a judicious reciprocity treaty with Cuba."

The Illinois republicans, at Springfield, on May 8, 1902, endorsed the President's policy and declared in favor of a reciprocal trade treaty with Cuba.

At Indianapolis, on April 24, 1902, the Indiana republicans endorsed the President and favored "just and liberal reciprocal

PHILANDER C. KNOX,
Attorney-General.

relations between the United States and Cuba."

Iowa republicans, at Des Moines, on July 30, 1902, endorsed the President's administration in general and his Cuban reciprocity policy in particular, Kansas republicans did the same in their convention at Wichita on May 28, 1902. Similar declarations were made by Massachusetts republicans at Boston, on October 3, 1902; by Missouri republicans at Jefferson City on June 25, 1902. Republicans in Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont and Wyoming took similar action.

In Minnesota the republicans at their convention at St. Paul on July 1, endorsed the President's Cuban policy, saying:

"We favor reciprocity with Cuba, urged by President Roosevelt, by a plan which will insure the profitable interchange of commodities, insure to the benefits of both nations, help the Cuban people needing assistance, but the chief benefits of which shall not enrich trusts, monopolies or for-

eign speculators, or which shall not interrupt our home production.''

President Roosevelt himself could ask no more. He went no further. His endorsement by the Minnesota republicans was all the more gratifying from the fact that Minnesota's republican representatives in congress were among the foremost of those who had opposed the reciprocity bill.

The Michigan republican convention at Detroit on June 26 endorsed the President's administration, but refrained from specifying the Cuban reciprocity measure. This was hardly to be expected, because Michigan's congressmen had led the fight on the bill; and the republican convention declined to administer a personal rebuke to men whose sincerity could not be doubted and whose motives in opposing Cuban reciprocity could not be assailed from the standpoint of the interests of their constituents.

President Roosevelt was so confident that the voters of the United States would endorse his Cuban policy that he lost no time

in negotiating a reciprocity treaty. In November General Tasker H. Bliss, an expert in tariff schedules, was sent to Havana as a minister plenipotentiary to negotiate a treaty which should provide for a horizontal reduction of United States tariff rates on Cuban products of at least 20, and perhaps 25 per cent., and a differential tariff in Cuba in favor of American goods, the latter to be effected not by a reduction of the existing Cuban tariff on American goods, but by an increase of it upon the goods of all other countries. This latter arrangement was recognized as necessary in order to maintain a sufficient revenue for the Cuban treasury.

General Bliss for the United States, and Senors Carlos de Zaldo and Jose M. Garcia Montes representing Cuba, signed the reciprocity treaty at Havana on December 11, 1902.

The reciprocity treaty was laid before the senate at Washington without delay. But a new difficulty presented itself. The opposition to the principle of Cuban reci-

procity itself was less marked, perhaps, than in the previous session, but the new objection was raised that the senate alone could not ratify a treaty making changes in tariff schedules, and thus impair the revenues. It was held that the house, in which all measures affecting the revenue must originate, necessarily would have to give its consent to the treaty.

Ordinarily, treaties are ratified by the senate alone. From the foundation of the government it has been held that the treaty making power rests with the President and the senate. The right of the house to pass upon treaties has never been recognized.

There were few precedents in the history of the government to guide President Roosevelt in reaching a decision on the question. During the administration of President Washington a treaty involving the revenues of the government was negotiated and ratified by the senate. The lower house believed that its constitutional rights had been impaired and adopted a resolution calling on President Washington

to submit all the papers in the case to the house. President Washington refused, and not until the treaty was ratified by the senate and officially proclaimed did he send a copy of it to the house "for its information."

The same disputed question arose during the administration of James Madison, when he sent to the senate a commercial treaty with Great Britain, negotiated after the conclusion of the war of 1812. In his message transmitting the treaty President Madison recommended legislation by both house and senate to carry the treaty into effect.

President Roosevelt, after a conference with leading members of the senate, decided to follow the precedent established by James Madison. It was agreed that the Cuban reciprocity treaty should first be sent to the senate. If it should be ratified by the necessary two-thirds vote the President then would send a special message to congress recommending the passage of a

law to carry the provisions of the treaty into effect.

The Cuban treaty was not to have plain sailing in the senate. First it aroused the hostility of some of the senators from the south, who declared that it was a blow aimed at two southern products, cane sugar and tobacco. Senators Foster of Louisiana and Taliaferro of Florida took the lead in this opposition from the south and they sought to consolidate the opposition to the treaty by inducing all the senators from the south to enter a caucus. This opposition looked serious at the time, as the ratification of the treaty depended upon the votes of all the republicans in the senate with five or six democrats additional in order to secure the necessary two-thirds majority.

Further, it soon became apparent that the treaty as presented to the senate could not be ratified until certain amendments had been agreed to. As originally drafted the treaty provided for a reduction of 20 per cent. of the tariff rates then in effect

or afterwards to be put into effect. It was asserted that if there should be a revision of the tariff, or if the democrats should come into power while the treaty was in effect and reduce the tariff rates 50 per cent., the Cuban sugar planters would derive the benefit. In order to prevent such a contingency it was proposed that the 20 per cent. reduction in tariff rates for the benefit of Cuba should continue in force only for five years.

This amendment, as well as one or two others, was not objectionable to President Roosevelt or to the friends of Cuba, and was agreed upon without friction.

On January 14, the senate committee on foreign affairs agreed to an amendment providing that the reduction of 20 per cent. in the tariff on Cuban sugar should not be further reduced by any preferential rate given to another country. To be more explicit the text of the amendment may be quoted:

"Provided, That while this convention is in force, no sugar being the product of

the soil of the republic of Cuba shall be exported from said republic to the United States at a greater reduction of duty than 20 per cent. below the rates prescribed by the act of July 24, 1897; and provided further, that while this convention is in force no sugar shall be imported into the United States from any foreign country at a lower rate of duty than that imposed by the act of July 24, 1897.''

On the following day another amendment was adopted by the senate committee on foreign relations providing for a reduction of 40 per cent. in the duty on American cattle imported into Cuba instead of 20 per cent. With these two amendments the treaty was reported to the senate on the same day, January 16, 1903.

From this time forward there was little doubt that the senate would ratify the treaty. On January 17 Senator Burrows of Michigan, who had, in 1902, opposed reciprocity with Cuba, assured the President that the treaty would have the support, with possibly one exception, of the nineteen

senators who had opposed reciprocity a year before.

The debate in the senate continued until March 19, 1903, when the treaty as amended was ratified by a vote of 50 to 16. All the affirmative votes were cast by republicans, with ten democrats. The negative votes were all democratic except one, Mr. Bard of California.

The amended treaty was returned to Cuba for a ratification in its amended form and in the meantime President Roosevelt announced that he would call a special session of congress in the fall for the purpose of urging legislation to carry the provisions of the treaty into effect. The Cuban senate ratified the amended treaty on March 29, and there the matter necessarily rested.

The special session met on November 9, and on the following day the President's message urging prompt action. It had been well understood that the special session had been called for the purpose of passing a Cuban reciprocity treaty and it

was equally understood by the country at large that President Roosevelt had won his battle. The ways and means committee acted promptly and the bill was reported. The opposition was only nominal and all amendments were voted down promptly. On November 19, ten days after the session opened, the Cuban tariff bill passed the house by a vote of 385 to 21. A roll call was not necessary.

No vote in the recent history of congress has shown so remarkable a reversal of sentiment. On June 13, 1902, the President, in a message almost pathetic in its plea for justice and fair treatment for a young republic, just taking its place among the nations of the world after a long and exhausting war for independence, appealed to the republican majority in the house for lower tariff duties for Cuba. The appeal fell upon unheeding ears. On December 19, 1903, less than two years later, the house, still with a republican majority, gave Cuba a reciprocity tariff by a vote that was to all intents and purposes a unanimous one. No

more striking tribute to the statesman-like qualities of the President could have been paid him. To persistently advocate a wise national policy in the face of opposition is one thing, but to advocate a wise policy and to convert a hostile majority in congress from almost indignant opposition to one of eager complacency, is a triumph of statesmanship that has fallen to the lot of few men who have occupied the White House.

President Roosevelt had opposed his party without breaking with it. He had advocated a policy opposed by many leaders in his party without quarreling with them. He won his fight for Cuban reciprocity and retained the love and esteem of his party colleagues. A greater man could not have done more. A weaker man would have disrupted his party.

There never was a question as to the success of the Cuban reciprocity measure in the senate; yet the senate was not so prompt in its action. The upper house of congress has its own traditions and seldom departs

from them. It decided to vote on the Cuban bill on December 16, a week after the opening of the regular session, and it refused to vote before that day. The special session, therefore, expired by limitation before final action on the Cuban bill was taken.

On December 16, therefore, the senate passed the Cuban reciprocity tariff bill by a vote of 57 to 18. Of those who voted against the bill all were democrats, except one, Senator Bard of California.

President Roosevelt signed the Cuban bill on December 17, and on the same day issued a proclamation declaring it should be in full force and effect on December 27. Thus ended the President's struggle with his party to gain commercial advantages to the new republic—a republic he had risked his life on the battlefield to help create.

Time already has justified the wisdom of the President's Cuban policy. Already prosperity, shattered by the long contest with Spain in the struggle for freedom, is beginning to smile upon the island repub-

lic. Cuba is gaining daily in trade and industry and the United States has not lost by the growing commercial advancement of the island.

CHAPTER VI.

THE PANAMA CANAL.

THE victory of the policy of reciprocity for Cuba had been won on December 19, 1903, a month and a day after the new republic of Panama had signed a treaty granting to the United States the right to construct the Panama canal, and with the history of that great waterway, now in process of construction by the United States, always must be associated the name of Theodore Roosevelt.

There is no purpose here to claim for President Roosevelt more credit for the completion of the negotiations for the right to construct, own and control the great interoceanic waterway than he deserves. But the history of current events may be judged only by their results. A president with less courage than Theodore Roosevelt would have shrunk from accepting the responsibility that he assumed when he seized the opportunity presented by a successful

revolution of the Isthmian states to secure for the United States for all time to come the ownership and control of the Panama canal. For the clearness of his foresight, for his quickness to grasp opportunities which come to nations but seldom in a century, and for his courage in facing possible but not improbable complications, the President was assailed in congress and out of it by men whose lives have been spent in the service of the republic. He refused to falter in the face of that criticism and his course was upheld not only by the votes of his own party in the senate, but by the votes of his party opponents. And not only was his policy endorsed, but the predictions of war and disaster that were to follow, proved to be unwarranted. The United States owns the canal zone, is digging the canal, and there is no war with the republic of Colombia.

The history of the Panama canal enterprise would fill volumes. It can be given here only in its broad outlines. A hurried survey of the events connected with so great

an enterprise will be justified, however, because the final chapter of that history is the record of the greatest triumph of President Roosevelt's administration.

A canal to cut the isthmus of Panama, thus connecting the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, has been the dream of nations for centuries. The earliest explorers of the American continent could not be convinced that nature had raised so formidable a barrier to commerce as that opposed by the narrow ledge of morass and mountains that connected the North and South American continents.

Vasco Munez de Balbao, governor of Darien, in 1513, plunged into the interior of what he believed to be a continent. He crossed a narrow range of mountains and found—not the land of river and plain that he expected—but the Pacific ocean. He refused to believe that so narrow a strip of land could divide two such mighty oceans and he searched for a visionary channel. For nearly 200 years explorers were deluded with the belief that there was a nat-



GEORGE B. CORTELYOU,
Secretary of Commerce and Labor.

ural waterway connecting the two oceans, and as late as the year 1771 geographers sent to search for a river that was believed to flow through some hidden pass in the mountains from one ocean to the other.

Meanwhile a land route from the Atlantic to the Pacific had been surveyed in 1520 under direction of Philip V., King of Spain, the city of Panama having been founded three years before. During the first century of Spanish rule on the American continent the growth of the isthmian commerce grew so rapidly that the city of Panama became one of the world's important ports.

In 1534 the King of Spain ordered a survey for an artificial canal—the first definite step in an enterprise which the United States to-day has undertaken to complete. The first step, however, was not favorable to the enterprise, Pascual Andagoya, then governor of Darien, advancing the objection that to sever the isthmus would be to question the wisdom of God, who for purposes of His own, had raised a barrier be-

tween the two oceans. King Philip was too good a Christian to oppose his views to the evident will of the Almighty, and the project as far as he was concerned was abandoned.

The years grew into decades and decades swelled into centuries, but no further efforts were made to realize the dream of an interoceanic waterway. The project was earnestly discussed, however, and the more its importance became recognized the more the stupendous nature of the undertaking was realized and modern engineering shrank from a task involving so gigantic an effort and so great an outlay of money.

Ferdinand de Lesseps, the French engineer, completed the Suez canal in 1869 at a cost of $100,000,000. When he began the project he defied the predictions of the best engineers of the world. But he completed it and cut the distance from Europe to India and the Orient in two.

Flushed with the success of the Suez canal and with the plaudits of the world

ringing in his ears, De Lesseps declared he would dig the Panama canal.

French interest had been directed to the Isthmus of Panama in a languid way by Lieut. N. B. Wyse, who had for some years been negotiating with Colombia for a canal concession. In 1876 he organized in Paris the Societe Civile Internationale du Canal Interoceanic, and two years later obtained a concession from Colombia. But Wyse was only a lieutenant in the French navy. De Lesseps was a name to conjure with. The French people would not invest in the shares of the Wyse company. They clamored for shares in a De Lesseps company. De Lesseps in 1878 organized the Compagnie Universelle du Canal Interoceanique. Money flowed into the coffers in floods. Lieut. Wyse sold his concession to the De Lesseps company for $2,000,000, and then followed the years of hope, disappointment, fraud, incompetency and disaster which followed the great French engineer's project of realizing the dream of the centuries.

De Lesseps planned a tide water canal 72 feet wide, 29½ feet deep. He declared he could complete it in eight years at a cost of $131,600,000. Examinations, surveys and preliminary work delayed the beginning of the actual undertaking until 1883. For six years the work was prosecuted with spasmodic energy. Each year of the six was a tragedy. Incompetency and roguery dominated the enterprise from the beginning. The French press was subsidized to conceal and misrepresent. The thrifty peasantry of France, deceived by the glamour of the enterprise, poured the hoardings of years into the enterprise, until $500,000,000 had been taken and spent.

The first five years swallowed these $500,000,000, and scarcely a beginning had been made on the canal. One historian in Pearson's Magazine for 1903 described the methods which permitted so wasteful an expenditure of funds. He writes:

"Jungles, swamps and tropical climate had to be overcome; fraud and incompetency clogged the efforts put forward for that end. Records of life on the isthmus at that period show the lazy workmen languidly toiling in the sun a few hours each day. Red tape, procrastination, mismanagement, were universal. Expensive machinery brought from Europe was permitted to rust in torrential overflows. Steam dredges costing thousands of dollars went to wrack and ruin while waiting for backward contractors to blast out a rocky ledge that prevented their operations. Ships loaded with material were held in harbor under costly demurrage while half their crews died of fever. Through somebody's foolish blunder locomotives of the wrong gauge were brought from Belgium and allowed to sink where they stood in mud and slime.

"Floods demolished in a night the ill-constructed work of weeks. The coolie laborers died like flies. The contractors cheated the negroes. Money which poured

into the isthmus in a steady stream from France disappeared as if dropped into quicksand, so far as tangible results were observed. The sum of $5,000,000 was spent in the construction of a single town. Costly hospitals were put up and expensive medical stores were allowed to spoil before being delivered to the doctors in charge."

This pen picture of the first efforts to dig the Panama canal inadequately reveals the causes which led to the collapse of the De Lesseps company. In 1889 came the crash. Ferdinand de Lesseps and his son Charles were declared guilty of swindling and were sentenced to prison. The great engineer of the Suez canal died before the prison doors opened to him, his name tarnished because he was a victim of the men associated with him.

Thus ended the De Lesseps enterprise. His company was dissolved, but almost immediately another French company was formed, the New Panama Canal Company, from which the United States within the

last few weeks has received a title to all its rights, property and interests in the great interoceanic waterway by the payment of $40,000,000.

The engineers sent to the isthmus by the New Panama Company estimated the value of the De Lesseps company's plant and the work already accomplished at $90,000,000. They reported that the canal could be completed for $180,000,000. On December 26, 1890, the new company obtained a ten years' extension on the canal concession. Later Colombia agreed that the ten years' concession should extend to October 31, 1904, and still again the concession was extended to October 31, 1910.

The new Panama Canal Company went to work in a business-like way. It purchased the Panama railroad. It obtained powers to operate ships and steamer lines, to carry mails, passengers and merchandise, to construct wharves, warehouses, telegraph and telephone lines. It purchased an immense quantity of material and gave every evidence of being backed

by vigor and ability. But the new company failed—not ingloriously, like its predecessor—but none the less certainly.

In all these years of misdirected French endeavor there was a growing sentiment in the United States for an isthmian canal to be owned, operated and controlled by the United States. At first it was taken for granted that Colombia's concessions to the French companies had forestalled American enterprise on the isthmus. Naturally, therefore, the attention of the people of this country became fixed upon the Nicaraguan route. Here the United States possessed exclusive rights, secured by a treaty signed in 1867. As the public demand for an American owned canal became more insistent the Nicaraguan route was the more strongly urged—so strongly and so persistently, in fact, that in time the Nicaraguan route came to be regarded as the only practical one available to the United States.

On February 20, 1889, the year which marked the inglorious disaster to the De Lesseps company, congress passed an act



JAMES WILSON,
Secretary of Agriculture.

incorporating the Maratime Canal Company of Nicaragua. That company secured the necessary concession and began work. From the start it became apparent that the Maratime Company would not be able to finance so great an undertaking. Various efforts were made in congress to secure government aid for the company. In 1891 John Sherman introduced a bill, by the provisions of which the United States guaranteed the principal and interest of $100,000,000 in bonds to be issued by the Maratime Company. Congress refused to pass it. A similar proposal made in congress in 1893 by Mr. Frye of Maine met a like fate. In 1894 Senator Morgan of Alabama introduced a similar bill. It failed to appeal to the business judgment of congress.

Then efforts were renewed in behalf of private enterprise, along a different line. Senator Morgan on June 1, 1896, on March 16, 1897, and on May 5, 1898, introduced bills in congress proposing that the United States purchase 700,000 shares

of the Maratime Canal Company's stock and guarantee the payment of the bonds to be issued by that company. Congress successively rejected all three of Senator Morgan's proposals, but he returned to the attack and on June 20, 1898, introduced a bill providing that the secretary of the treasury be empowered to take 925,000 of the million shares of the canal company's stock, and in payment to issue treasury warrants to the amount of $115,000,000 to cover the expenditure for canal construction.

There was much of debate and much of newspaper discussion, but the efforts to induce congress to extend financial aid to the extent of $100,000,000 or more to a private incorporation failed. The people of the United States had not forgotten the bonds issued to aid the construction of the Pacific railways. It is true, the government finally was reimbursed, but the sentiment of the country was strong against repeating the experiment.

In the meantime the United States had

engaged in war with Spain, and the voyage of the Oregon around Cape Horn had taught a national lesson. The first popular demand upon congress after the signing of the treaty of peace was for the immediate construction of an isthmian canal. Congress could not ignore so insistent a demand, even had its members been so inclined. On December 7, 1899, a bill was introduced in the house authorizing the President to acquire from Costa Rica and Nicaragua the control of the territory necessary for the construction and defense of a ship canal by way of Lake Nicaragua. The limit of expenditure was fixed at $140,000,000.

This bill passed the house on May 2, 1900, by a vote of 224 yeas to 36 nays; 92 not voting. The measure went to the senate, but was delayed there by the negotiations incident to the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. The abrogation of this treaty was deemed necessary —as indeed it was necessary. It was negotiated in 1850 and provided for joint de-

fense and control of any isthmian canal thereafter to be constructed. The people of this country were in no mind to assume a divided responsibility, and insisted that the isthmian canal, when constructed, should be owned, controlled and defended by the United States alone. A treaty modifying the Clayton-Bulwer convention was signed by Secretary of State Hay and Sir Julian Pauncefote, the British ambassador, in 1899. It was rejected by the senate at the unmistakable demand of the people. A second treaty was negotiated, and signed on February 5, 1900, in which the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was definately abrogated as far as its reference to the isthmian canal was concerned. The abrogation of the compact of 1850 cleared away the last diplomatic and political obstacle to American ownership and control of the proposed canal.

While the diplomatic debris was being cleared away, experienced engineers had been sent into the field to examine not only the Nicaraguan but the Panama route

as well. Congress had provided the funds and President McKinley had named the commission. The Isthmian Canal Commission held its first meeting at Washington in June, 1899. Rear Admiral John G. Walker, U. S. N., retired, was elected president. The other members of the commission were Lieut. Col. Ernst, U. S. A., Samuel Pasco, George S. Morrison, Lewis M. Haupt, civil engineer, Alfred Noble, civil engineer, Colonel Peter C. Haines, engineer corps of the United States army, William H. Burr, civil engineer, and Prof. Emery R. Johnston. Lieutenant Commander Sidney A. Staunton, U. S. N., was chosen secretary.

The commission took up the study of the isthmian canal question without delay. Five committees were appointed to investigate the following subjects: The Nicaraguan route; the Panama route; other possible routes; the industrial, commercial and military value of an interoceanic canal; and rights, privileges and franchises. Working parties of trained

engineers were sent over the Nicaraguan, Panama and Darien routes. A committee went to Europe to study the Kiel, the North Sea and Manchester ship canals.

The several committees and the field engineering parties completed their alloted tasks with as much expedition as the importance of the great question permitted. A preliminary report was submitted to congress recommending the Nicaraguan route as being the most practicable and feasible one for an isthmian canal under the control of the United States. The cost was estimated, in round numbers, at $189,000,000. The commission, as subsequent developments proved, really favored the Panama route; but the French company, while acknowledging its own inability to complete the Panama canal, refused to surrender its valuable concession to the United States for less than $109,000,000. The Walker commission, after careful surveys and estimates, declared the French company's rights were worth $40,000,000, and no more.

Congress responded to the demands of the country at once. President Roosevelt, in his first message, urged congress to take prompt action, but he recommended neither the Nicaraguan nor the Panama route. On January 7, Congressman Hepburn introduced in the house a bill directing the President to construct the Nicaraguan canal and appropriating not to exceed $180,000,000 for the work. This bill was debated two days and passed on January 9, by a vote of 308 yeas to 2 nays.

The passage of the Hepburn bill on January 9, 1902, brought the French company to terms instanter. On the same day President Bo, of the French company, cabled from Paris that it would accept $40,000,000 for all its property and concessions in Panama. Two days later President Bo repeated his cablegram, and again on January 14 he cabled that he had mailed a proposal to accept the $40,000,000.

The frantic eagerness of the French company to get out of Panama had been

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foreseen by the Walker Commission, and on it promptly presented a final report recommending the Panama route. The commission's reasons for favoring the Panama route were clear, logical and convincing. It was shown that the Nicaragua canal would cost $189,864,062, and the Panama canal $184,333,258. The Nicaragua canal would be 184 miles long, the Panama, 49 miles. It would require vessels 33 hours to pass through the Nicaragua canal and only 12 hours to traverse the one at Panama.

The Hepburn bill directing the construction of the Nicaragua canal already had passed the house. It was amended in the senate after a lengthy and earnest debate. The champions of the Nicaragua route did not surrender without a struggle; but finally they were compelled to yield to a compromise. On June 19 the senate's substitute for the Hepburn bill was passed by a vote of 67 yeas to 6 nays. The house, after some difficulty, accepted the senate bill. It directed the President

to construct a ship canal from the Caribbean sea to the Pacific ocean, and provided funds not to exceed $180,000,000 for the purpose. He was authorized to pay the French company $40,000,000 for all its property, rights and concessions, and to complete the Panama canal, providing he secure a good title and obtain by treaty with the United States of Colombia complete and perpetual control of the canal zone across the isthmus. If he could not secure such a title from the French company, and such perpetual control from the United States of Colombia within a reasonable time, he was to proceed with the construction of the Nicaragua canal.

The reader will scan the pages of American history in vain for an incident in which congress imposed a greater trust in a President. Congress, in effect, said to President Roosevelt: "Here is $180,000,000. Take it and build a ship canal. Select your own route." History has recorded few instances in which a ruler has

been given so great a mandate. And yet congress with scarcely a dissenting vote placed this responsibility in the hands of Theodore Roosevelt. The United States senate is regarded by civilized governments the world around as the most conservative deliberative body in the world. From the date of the foundation of the republic the senate never has been accused of arriving rashly or hastily at an immature judgment. And yet in the senate there were only two men who voted against the proposal to place in Theodore Roosevelt's hands the tremendous responsibility of selecting an isthmian canal route, of choosing the men to direct the construction of the waterway, and of expending so enormous a sum. And these two men voted no, not because of any lack of confidence in the judgment of Theodore Roosevelt, but because they had been the earnest and sincere champions of a particular canal and they could not bring themselves to the point of surrendering convictions that had been attained

by many years of careful study of the greatest engineering problem that had seriously been proposed in many centuries.

The responsibility of selecting a route for the isthmian canal was not of Theodore Roosevelt's seeking. But when it was placed upon his shoulders he accepted its burden with the calm confidence of a man sure of himself. Subsequent developments in the history of the canal enterprise have revealed not one false step, not one mistake. Recent events on the isthmus of Panama compelled President Roosevelt to negotiate new treaties. He was criticised at the time; but the criticism came only from one man who had persistently championed the Nicaragua route and who would not give up, and from a man who, under the enormous stress of a pending national campaign, sought to create a new political issue. Neither of these men were upheld by their own party colleagues. For a second time the senate by a non-partisan vote declared that President Roosevelt was right.

There were two phases to the negotiations which resulted finally in the acceptance of the Panama route for the isthmian canal. Congress passed the canal bill with what is known as the Spooner amendment on June 19, 1902. President Roosevelt lost no time in beginning negotiations with Colombia for a treaty which would secure to the United States the perpetual control of the strip of territory through which the proposed canal must pass. There were delicate subjects to handle, for while Colombia apparently was eager to have the United States construct the canal, there was a natural aversion on the part of the government of the South American republic to surrender sovereignty over the canal zone. This difficulty, however, was surmounted, and on January 22, 1903, a formal treaty was signed by Secretary Hay for the United States and Dr. Herren, the charge d'affairs of the Colombian legation. This treaty was ratified by the United States senate on March 17, and immediately

transmitted to Bogota. By the terms of the treaty Colombia leased the canal strip to the United States for the period of one hundred years in consideration of the payment of $10,000,000 down and an annual rental. The United States was given the right to fortify the canal and to maintain a force of military police along its entire length. This was necessary to ensure the safety of the canal in time of foreign war or civil strife.

President Marroquin summoned the Colombian congress to meet at Bogota on July 24, 1903, for the purpose of ratifying the canal treaty. On August 17 the Colombian senate rejected the convention. The forces which worked to secure the defeat of the treaty have never been fully revealed; but there is evidence that a strong cabal in Colombia believed, or affected to believe, that by rejecting the treaty and negotiating a new one a sum larger than $10,000,000 could be secured from the United States.

Colombia's refusal to ratify the canal treaty led to startling but not unexpected events. The congress at Bogota adjourned on October 30, 1903, and on November 3, four days later, the state of Panama seceded from the United States of Colombia. The secession of Panama had been foreseen in this country. It was known for months that the people of Panama, whose future welfare and prosperity were dependent upon the construction of the canal, would sever their allegiance from a republic so indifferent to their interests. Many weeks before the formal act of secession cabled dispatches to newspapers in the United States told of the active preparations for revolt, of the collection of arms, of the plans of the leaders.

The secession took place without a clash of arms. It was precipitated by the arrival at Colon of 500 Colombian soldiers, sent by the Bogota government to prevent it. The independence of the isthmian republic was proclaimed at Panama on the

evening of November 3. The people were practically unanimous for separation, and the revolt was immediately successful. At Colon the situation was threatening for a few hours because of the presence of 500 Colombian troops, who sought to seize the Panama railroad, cross the isthmus and attack the forces of the newly proclaimed republic. Such a procedure, without doubt would have led to a bitter struggle along the line of the railroad, to the indefinite demoralization of traffic. This the United States, under its treaty obligations, was bound to prevent. A force of marines, forty in number, were landed at Colon from the gunboat Nashville, and these forty men were formidable enough to hold the 500 Colombian soldiers in check and to prevent them from carrying out their threatened seizure of the Panama railway.

President Roosevelt immediately took steps looking to the formal recognition of the new republic. On November 6 the state department was notified that a pro-

visional government had been formed at Panama. On November 7 M. Bunau-Varilla was appointed minister from Panama to the United States, and on November 13 he was formally received as the duly accredited envoy of a sovereign and independent state. This amounted to an official recognition of the existence of the new republic, and Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia and other foreign powers followed the example set by the United States within a few weeks.

Colombia protested vigorously and threatened to invade Panama. For a few weeks the attitude of the South American republic was so menacing that the navy department decided, as a precautionary measure, to send a force of marines—1,500 men in all—to protect the Panama railroad and to guard American interests on the isthmus. Nothing, however, came of Colombia's bellicose threats. Gen. Rafael Reyes visited the United States in hopes of averting action friendly to Panama, but his mission came to naught.

On November 18, 1903, a treaty was signed at Washington, by which Panama granted to the United States in perpetuity the use, occupation and control of the canal zone. In return the United States guaranteed to maintain the independence of the republic of Panama and agreed to pay the new republic $10,000,000 in hand and $250,000 annually. The treaty was ratified at Panama on December 2 and laid before the senate at Washington early in the session.

The canal treaty provoked a violent outcry from a few men in the senate and from a few politicians who imagined for the moment that it might be made to serve as a political issue. President Roosevelt, however, was upheld by an overwhelming majority of the people, without regard to politics. His few opponents denounced him as having participated in the spoliation of a republic with whom the United States had always maintained the most friendly relations. The President was accused of distorting a treaty

with a friendly republic and thus making it an aid to secession. The President's assailants declared that he should have construed the treaty of 1846 as requiring him to uphold the sovereignty of the republic of Colombia in Panama, and that therefore he should have used the armed force of the United States—not to preserve peace and order on the isthmus and to maintain railroad traffic—but to prevent the secession of the state of Panama and to assist Colombia to regain control over a people who had with scarcely a dissenting voice proclaimed their independence.

The clamor of the few partisan opponents of the President attracted only passing notice. A calm analysis of the noisy vehemence of a few senators proved that even the President's opponents had no alternative course to suggest. The people were quick to see that the President had taken advantage of natural events to secure rights for which the United States

had been hopelessly negotiating for decades.

President Roosevelt, unswerved by the personal attacks made upon him by the friends of the Nicaraguan canal, or by the handful of democratic senators who sought to inflame the public mind against him, boldly appealed to the people for justification of his course. His message to congress on the subject of the isthmian canal will appear in future histories as one of the greatest state papers ever written. It was masterly in its presentation of the reasons which had actuated the President. It was not a defense. It was unanswerable. It left his detractors without a peg upon which to hang an argument.

Inasmuch as this message, read to both houses of congress on December 7, 1903, covered every feature of the controversy with the United States of Colombia, it will be reproduced here with only such abridgement as the exigencies of space de-

mand. The President introduced the subject by saying:

"By the act of June 28, 1902, the congress authorized the President to enter into treaty with Colombia for the building of the canal across the isthmus of Panama; it being provided that in the event of failure to secure such treaty after the lapse of a reasonable time recourse should be had to building a canal through Nicaragua. It has not been necessary to consider this alternative, as I am enabled to lay before the senate a treaty providing for the building of the canal across the Isthmus of Panama. This was the route which commended itself to the deliberate judgment of the congress, and we can now acquire by treaty the right to construct the canal over this route. The question now, therefore, is not by which route the isthmian canal shall be built, for that question has been definitely and irrevocably decided. The question is simply, whether or not we shall have an isthmian canal."

President Roosevelt then reviewed in detail the relations between the United States and Colombia as affected by the treaty of 1846 and passed on to a history of the negotiation of the canal treaty, saying:

"This treaty was entered into at the earnest solicitation of the people of Colombia and after a body of experts appointed by our government especially to go into the matter of the routes across the isthmus had pronounced unanimously in favor of the Panama route.

"In drawing up the treaty, every concession was made to the people and to the government of Colombia. We were more than just in dealing with them. Our generosity was such as to make it a serious question whether we had not gone too far in their interests at the expense of our own, for in our scrupulous desire to pay all possible heed not merely to the real but even to the fancied rights of our weaker neighbor, who already owed so much to our protection and forbear-

ance, we yielded in all possible ways to her desires in drawing up the treaty.

"Nevertheless the government of Colombia not merely repudiated the treaty, but repudiated it in such manner as to make it evident by the time the Colombian congress adjourned that not the scantiest hope remained of ever getting a satisfactory treaty from them. The government of Colombia made the treaty, and yet when the Colombian congress was called to ratify it the vote against ratification was unanimous. It does not appear that the government made any real effort to secure ratification."

Passing to the revolt on the isthmus and the recognition of the new republic of Panama, President Roosevelt said:

"Immediately after the adjournment of the Colombian congress a revolution broke out in Panama. The people of Panama had long been discontented with the republic of Colombia, and they had been kept quiet only by the prospect of the conclusion of the treaty, which was to

them a matter of vital concern. When it became evident that the treaty was hopelessly lost the people of Panama rose literally as one man. Not a shot was fired on the isthmus in the interests of the Colombian government. Not a life was lost in the accomplishment of the revolution. The Colombian troops stationed on the isthmus, who had long been unpaid, made common cause with the people of Panama, and with astonishing unanimity the new republic was started.

"The duty of the United States in the premises was clear. In strict accordance with the principles laid down by Secretaries Cass and Seward, the United States gave notice that it would permit the landing of no expeditionary force the arrival of which would mean chaos and destruction along the line of the railroad and of the proposed canal, and an interruption of transit as an inevitable consequence."

Continuing, President Roosevelt reviewed the history of the isthmus since 1846, showing that scarcely a year had

not witnessed an attempted revolution. He gave dates and details of fifty-three revolutions, rebellions, insurrections and riots that occurred within a period of fifty-seven years. The record of turbulence and the strife of almost continuous civil war President Roosevelt declared proved that Colombia had been utterly incapable of keeping order on the isthmus. He continued:

"The above recital of facts establishes beyond question, first, that the United States has for over half a century patiently and in good faith carried out its obligations under the treaty of 1846; second, that when for the first time it became possible for Colombia to do anything in requital for the services thus repeatedly rendered to it for fifty-seven years by the United States, the Colombian government peremptorily and offensively refused thus to do its part, even though to do so would have been to its advantage and immeasurably to the advantage of the state of Panama; third, that throughout this pe-

riod revolutions, riots and factional disturbances, instead of showing any sign of abating, have tended to grow more numerous and more serious in the immediate past; fourth, that the control of Colombia over the isthmus of Panama could not be maintained without the armed intervention and assistance of the United States. In other words, the government of Colombia, though wholly unable to maintain order on the isthmus, has nevertheless declined to ratify a treaty, the conclusion of which opened the only chance to secure its own stability and to guarantee permanent peace on and the construction of a canal across the isthmus.

"Under such circumstances," said the President, in conclusion, "the government of the United States would have been guilty of folly and weakness amounting in their sum to a crime against the nation had it acted otherwise than it did when the revolution of November 3 last took place in Panama.

"This great enterprise of building the interoceanic canal cannot be held up to gratify the whims, or out of respect to governmental impotence, or to the even more sinister and evil political peculiarities of a people who, though they dwell afar off, yet against the wish of the actual dwellers on the isthmus, assert an unreal supremacy over that territory.

"The possession of a territory fraught with such peculiar capacities as the isthmus in question carries with it obligations to mankind. The course of events has shown that the canal cannot be built by private enterprise or by any other nation than our own. Hence it must be built by the United States.

"Every effort has been made by the government of the United States to persuade Colombia to follow a course which was essentially not only to our own interest and to the interest of the world, but to the interests of Colombia itself. These efforts have failed, and Colombia, by her persistence in repulsing the advances that

have been made, has forced us, for the sake of our own honor and of the interests and well being, not merely of our own people, but of the people of the isthmus of Panama, and the people of the civilized countries of the world, to take decisive steps to bring to an end a condition of affairs which had become intolerable."

President Roosevelt's message ended the controversy. The senate debated the Panama treaty with its usual deliberation, but its ratification was certain from the beginning. An attempt was made to organize an opposition among the democratic senators, but it failed. The treaty was ratified on February 23, 1904, by a vote of 66 to 14. President Roosevelt appointed the canal commission on February 29, as follows: Rear Admiral John G. Walker, U. S. N., retired; Maj. Gen. George W. Davis, U. S. A., retired, District of Columbia; William H. Burr, New York; Benjamin M. Harrod, Louisiana; Carl Ewald Grunsky, California;

Frank J. Hecker, Michigan; W. B. Parsons, New York.

All legal steps to convey the title of the French company to the United States have been completed in Paris and the canal commission already has made its first official inspection of the canal route. The American flag is flying over the canal zone and already work has begun on the waterway which is to sever two continents, and link two oceans, forever to be open to the commerce of the world, under the protection of the United States.

CHAPTER VII.

THE MERGER DECISION.

THE decision of the United States supreme court, sustaining President Roosevelt's legal battle in defense of the rights of the common people, and to prevent the consolidation of great railway systems, came within a few months after his triumph in securing reciprocity for Cuba and in insuring the immediate construction of the Panama canal.

The United States supreme court, in a decision announced on March 14, 1904, declared that the control of the Northern Pacific and Great Northern railways by the Northern Securities Company was an ingenious plan to consolidate two parallel and competing lines of railroad by the device of a holding company, and that therefore it was a violation of the federal law, because it was a combination in restraint of trade.

The decision of the supreme court was a remarkable tribute to President Roosevelt. It was the President that directed the attorney general to bring the suit against the Northern Securities Company. It was the President who urged the enactment of the law by congress which enabled, or required, the federal courts to expedite the suits. No other President ever attacked so boldly and so vigorously so great an aggregation of capitalized interests.

President Roosevelt is not an enemy of capital. He is not a rampant "trust buster." But in the formation of the Northern Securities Company he saw, more quickly than any one else, a menace to the business interests of the country. If the Northern Securities Company could by a bold subterfuge control two or three great transcontinental lines of railroad, a "Western Securities Company" could consolidate the remaining lines to the Pacific—an "Eastern Securities Company" could unite the great Atlantic seaboard

lines—a "Southern Securities Company" could control the great lines leading to the gulf—and finally all these "security companies" might themselves be united into a "United States Securities Company" and thus in time every line of railroad might have been brought under the control of a single syndicate of men. The possibilities of injury to the commercial interests of the United States were unlimited. All competition would have been throttled. Some interests would have been favored at the expense of others. Such a syndicate—and it was contemplated—would have dictated the price the farmer should receive for his grain, the price the mill owner should receive for his product, the price the mine operator should receive for his coal and iron. From dictating prices to the great mining and manufacturing industries of the country to actually owning them would have been an easy step for a holding company that had absolute control of the transportation interests of the United States.

The formation of the Northern Securities Company was the boldest attack ever made by consolidated capital upon the real business interests of the country. President Roosevelt attacked it—not because it was a combination of capital, merely, but because it was a menace to the farmer, the business man, the small manufacturer.

The Northern Securities Company was incorporated, under the laws of the state of New Jersey, on November 13, 1901, a few weeks after Theodore Roosevelt had taken up the unfinished administration of President McKinley. It was capitalized to the enormous amount of $400,000,000. Only one company ever incorporated—the United States Steel Corporation—had a larger capital stock. The company was organized through the efforts of James J. Hill, president of the Great Northern Railroad Company, for the purpose of taking over and holding the stocks of the Northern Pacific and the Great Northern railways. The formation of the company

gave one set of men control of the two great transcontinental systems of the northwest, reaching from Chicago and St. Paul to Puget sound, on the Pacific ocean.

President Roosevelt saw at once that the Northern Securities Company was an organization in restraint of trade, and by his direction the attorney general brought suit in the United States circuit court at St. Paul, under the Sherman anti-trust act of 1890.

The President's attitude toward the capitalized interests of the country had been clearly defined in the first message he sent to congress, on December 3—less than a month after James J. Hill, J. Pierpont Morgan, E. H. Harriman and others powerful in the financial world, had defied the law by organizing the Northern Securities Company. In that message the President said:

"The tremendous and highly complex industrial development which went on with ever accelerated rapidity during the latter half of the nineteenth century

brings us face to face, at the beginning of the twentieth, with very serious social problems. The old laws and the old customs which had almost the binding force of law were once quite sufficient to regulate the accumulation of wealth. Since the industrial changes which so enormously have increased the productive power of mankind, they are no longer sufficient.

"The growth of cities has gone on beyond comparison faster than the growth of the country, and the upbuilding of the great industrial centers has meant a startling increase, not merely in the aggregate of wealth, but in the number of very large individual, and especially of very large corporate, fortunes. The creation of these great corporate fortunes has not been due to the tariff nor to any other governmental action, but to natural causes in the business world, operating in other countries as they operate in our own.

"The process has aroused much antagonism, a great part of which is wholly

without warrant. It is not true that as the rich have grown richer the poor have grown poorer. On the contrary, never before has the average man, the wage worker, the farmer, the small trader, been so well off as in this country and at the present time.

"There have been abuses connected with the accumulation of wealth; yet it remains true that a fortune accumulated in legitimate business can be accumulated by the person specially benefited only on condition of conferring immense incidental benefits upon others. Successful enterprise, of the type which benefits all mankind, can only exist if the conditions are such as to offer great prizes as the rewards of success.

"The captains of industry, who have driven the railway systems across this continent, who have built up our commerce, who have developed our manufactures, have, on the whole, done great good to our people. Without them the material

development of which we are so justly proud could never have taken place."

President Roosevelt then pointed out the necessity for caution in dealing with the corporations. He boldly declared that "for the government to undertake by crude and ill-considered legislation, to do what may turn out to be bad, would be to incur the risk of such far-reaching national disaster that it would be preferable to undertake nothing at all." He then presented the other side of the question, saying:

"Yet it is also true that there are real and grave evils, one of the chief being overcapitalization, because of its many baleful consequences; and a resolute and practical effort must be made to correct these evils.

"It is no limitation of property rights or freedom of contract to require that when men receive from the government the privilege of doing business under corporate form, which frees them from individual responsibility, and enables them

to call into their enterprise the capital of the public, they shall do so upon absolutely truthful representations as to the value of the property in which the capital is to be invested.

"Corporations engaged in interstate commerce should be regulated, if they are found to exercise a license working to the public injury. It should be as much the aim of those who seek for social betterment to rid the business world of crimes of cunning as to rid the entire body politic of crimes of violence. Great corporations exist only because they are created and safeguarded by our institutions; and it is, therefore, our duty to see that they work in harmony with these institutions."

Turning to the remedies for existing evils, President Roosevelt advocated no radical "trust smashing" policy. He did not seek to inflame the public mind against wealth. He was conservative without being overcautious. He gave the impression of a man who proposed that

the government should do its duty toward the whole people, but that no false start should be made. He continued:

"The first essential in determining how to deal with the great industrial combinations is knowledge of the facts—publicly. In the interests of the public, the government should have the right to inspect and examine the workings of the great corporations engaged in interstate business. Publicity is the only sure remedy which we can now invoke. What further remedies are needed in the way of governmental regulation, or taxation, can only be determined after publicity has been obtained, by process of law, and in the course of administration. The first requisite is knowledge, full and complete —knowledge which may be made public to all the world.

"The nation should without interfering with the power of the states in the matter itself, also assume power of supervision of and regulation over all corporations doing an interstate business. This is es-

pecially true where the corporation derives a portion of its wealth from the existence of some monopolistic element or tendency in its business.

"There would be no hardship in such supervision; banks are subject to it and in their case it is now accepted as a simple matter of course. Indeed, it is probable that supervision of corporations by the national government need not go so far as is now the case with the supervision exercised over them by so conservative a state as Massachusetts, in order to produce excellent results.

"I believe that a law can be framed which will enable the national government to exercise control along the lines above indicated, profiting by the experience gained through the passage and administration of the interstate commerce act. If, however, the judgment of congress is that it lacks the constitutional power to pass such an act, then a constitutional amendment should be submitted to confer the power."

Holding to the principles enumerated in his first message to congress, President Roosevelt could not permit the Northern Securities Company to carry out its project of consolidating two such great competing and parallel lines of railroad as the Northern Pacific and the Great Northern without making an effort to prevent it. Such a consolidation, he believed, was in violation of the Sherman anti-trust law passed by a republican congress in 1890 and signed by a republican president, Benjamin Harrison, on July 2, of that year.

Up to the formation of the Northern Securities Company the great railway interests had tacitly accepted the Sherman act, because as yet no method had been devised for successfully evading it. But the device of a holding company, to own the stock of two separate and competing lines, and to exercise full control over both while permitting each to retain its individual entity, finally suggested itself. The



CHARLES DICE.
Senator from Ohio.

Northern Securities Company was the result.

The attorney general of Minnesota attacked the merger company in the state courts and simultaneously President Roosevelt directed the attorney general to bring suit in the federal courts in behalf of the United States government. The government's suit was filed in the United States circuit court at St. Paul, Minn., on March 11, 1902. Necessarily the hearing of a case involving $400,000,000 consumed no little time and the end of the year 1902 was reached with the end of the suit not in sight. Then, too, the prospect of an indefinite postponement of a final decision in the supreme court of the United States presented itself. Under the laws of procedure, the case was certain to go to the United States court of appeals and from that tribunal to the supreme court of the United States, as it could only be presumed that the Securities Company would not accept the decree of a lower court as final. Between the circuit court to the

United States supreme court a delay of from four to six years was inevitable. Such a stay meant injury to the business interests of the country. The exigencies of a difficult situation presented itself to the chief executive and with his characteristic manner of going directly at a difficult problem he met the difficulty boldly and without hesitation.

President Roosevelt called a conference of republican leaders at the White House early in January, 1903. He outlined his plan for attacking the Northern Securities Company and asked for legislation to expedite the suits. Under the prevailing practice of the courts a decision in the United States supreme court could not be reached under several years. As a result of that conference a bill designed to expedite anti-trust legislation was introduced in congress. It passed the senate on February 4, 1903, and the house on the following day. President Roosevelt signed it on February 11.

Briefly, the law provides that any suit brought by the attorney general of the United States under the Sherman act shall be given precedence over all other cases in the circuit courts and be assigned for hearing at the earliest practicable date, before not less than three circuit judges. Any appeal from the decision of the circuit judges must go direct to the United States supreme court.

President Roosevelt did more than to ask for and secure the law expediting anti-trust litigation, but he asked for funds. Congress, already imbued with confidence in the executive, placed half a million dollars in his hands for the prosecution of cases under the Sherman act. This fund was to be used for the employment of special counsel and agents. The amount was provided for in the legislative, executive and judicial appropriation bill approved on February 26, 1903.

Four judges of the circuit court—namely, A. M. Thayer, H. C. Caldwell, Walter H. Sanborn and Willis Vandevanter—

heard the government's case against the Northern Securities Company. The government's case was ably presented on both sides, and the arguments of the opposing counsel were elaborate.

On April 9, 1903, the four judges who had heard the case, by unanimous agreement, decided that the Northern Securities Company was an illegal combination within the meaning of the Sherman act. A decree was entered adjudging that the stock of the Northern Pacific and Great Northern companies was acquired by the Northern Securities Company by virtue of a combination in restraint of trade and commerce among the several states, such as the Sherman anti-trust act of 1890 denounces as illegal. The decree further directed the dissolution of the Northern Securities Company and the return to the stockholders of the Northern Pacific and Great Northern the shares they had given in return for Northern Securities stock.

The decision of the four circuit judges left the Northern Securities Company but

little ground to stand upon. The court, after reciting the facts of the merger, declared:

"The scheme which was thus devised and consummated led inevitably to the following results:

"First, it placed the control of the two roads in the hands of a single person—to-wit, the Securities Company—by virtue of the ownership of a large majority of the stock of both companies.

"Second, it destroyed every motive for competition between two roads engaged in interstate traffic, which were natural competitors for business, by pooling the earnings of the two roads for the common benefit of the stockholders of both companies."

The four judges were in full accord in the findings in law and in fact. The opinion itself was written by Judge A. M. Thayer. It was a triumphant vindication of the Sherman anti-trust act. It established that act firmly as a part of the constitutional law of the land. It was a

decision that vindicated the statesmanship of its distinguished author of the anti-trust law, the wisdom of the congress that passed it, and the courage of the president that used it to attack the greatest combination of capitalized interests ever formed in the United States except one.

As had been foreseen, the case was appealed to the United States supreme court. The decision of that tribunal was handed down on March 14, 1904—less than a year after the decision of the circuit court and only three days more than two years from the day that the suit was begun in the lower court. The opinion of the supreme court sustained the judgment of the lower tribunal in every particular. The Northern Securities Company was forced to surrender the stock of the Northern Pacific and the Great Northern Companies and those railroads returned to the independent position each had held in the railway world prior to the formation of the holding company.

The dissolution of the Northern Securities Company, as a result of the vigorous assault of President Roosevelt, was accompanied by no shock to the financial world. The President had destroyed a combination representing $400,000,000 of capital, and yet not a dollar of vested interest was lost to a single man. The Northern Securities Company was destroyed, but the Northern Pacific and the Great Northern railroads remained, their stock as valuable as it was the day it passed to the control of the holding company.

President Roosevelt proved to the financial world that its prosperity did not depend upon the formation of illegal combinations. He proved to the people that he had the courage to right a wrong, even though the wrong represented so many hundreds of millions of capital. His courageous course proved that he could be trusted by the people and that he need not be distrusted as an enemy of lawful enterprise.

CHAPTER VIII.

AN ARMY SAVED FROM HUMILIATION.

THE war with Spain brought glory and humiliation to the United States—glory won when Dewey and the intrepid commanders and men under him sailed his fleet over channel mines and past the batteries at Corregidor island, entered the bay of Manila, attacked the Spanish fleet and destroyed it under the very guns of the Cavite forts. Glory there was when Leonard Wood and Theodore Roosevelt charged at the head of their rough riders into the tangled jungles at Las Guisimas and won a victory from an overwhelming force of Spanish troops, in the first land fighting on Cuban soil. Glory there was when the American soldiers—volunteer and regular—swept up the hills of San Juan and El Caney and planted the stars

and stripes on the crests. Glory there was in all the land fighting in Cuba, where the men under Shafter and Wheeler, Sumner, Lawton, Chaffee, Wood and Roosevelt marched and fought in dense undergrowth of tropical vegetation, over blind trails, across streams of unknown depths, up hills surmounted by hidden blockhouses. Enemy they could see none. The smokeless powder from the Spanish Mausers gave no sign. The dense chaparral hid everything. The Americans fought under burning sun and through nights of pouring rain. They went hungry and thirsty. They slept in trenches filled with slimy ooze. But they won. They proved anew the highest traditions of the American soldier. Then, too, glory there was when Cervera's fleet made its hopeless dash for liberty on that ill-fated Sunday morning.

Humiliation came before the glory was won. Humiliation there was in the discovery that the American army system was not equal to so slight an emergency

as that which arose when the nation was compelled to do battle with so decrepit a nation as Spain. The army itself was not to blame for the humiliation. The fault lay with the men who had permitted the army administration to become a weakened, unserviceable machine. The blame was with congress—not with the army. Even so distinguished a member of congress as Senator Henry Cabot Lodge does not hesitate to place the blame where it properly belonged. In his history, "The War with Spain," he reveals our national humiliation, saying:

"The American navy was ready, as ships of war must always be, and when the President signed the Cuban resolutions, the fleet started for Cuba without a moment's delay. With the army the case was widely different. Congress had taken care of the army in a spasmodic and insufficient manner, consistently doing nothing for it except to multiply civilian clerks and officials of all kinds, who justified their existence by a diligent

weaving of red tape and by magnifying details of work until all the realities of the service were thoroughly obscured.

"Thus we had a cumbrous, top-heavy system of administration, rusted and slow moving, and accustomed to care for an army of 25,000 men. An army of 200,000 volunteers and 60,000 regulars was suddenly demanded, and the poor old system of military administration, with its coils of red tape and its vast clerical force devoted to details, began to groan and creak, to break down here and to stop there, and to produce a vast crop of delays, blunders, and what was far worse, of needless suffering, disease and death, to the brave men in the field.

"Thereupon came great outcry from newspapers, rising even to hysterical shrieking in some cases, great and natural wrath among the American people, and fault-finding from senators and representatives. * * *

"There was, undoubtedly, a certain but not very large percentage of short-

comings due to individual incapacity, which should have been rooted up without regard to personal sensibilities. But the fundamental fact was that the chief and predominant cause of all the failures, blunders, and needless suffering was a thoroughly bad system of military administration.

"At the outset of our war we had a bad system, and men laid the blame here and there for faults of system and organization which were really due to the narrowness and indifference of congress, of the newspaper press, and of the people running back over many years. Today* the system stands guilty of the blunders, delays and needless sufferings and deaths of the war, and war being over, reforms are resisted by patriots who have so little faith in the republic that they think a properly organized army of 100,000 men puts it in danger."

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*Written in 1899.

Senator Lodge's severe but well deserved arraignment of the indifference of congress and people to the needs of the army prefaced a long list of mistakes of omission and commission in the conduct of the war with Spain. There were many that he did not refer to. The list of blunders made up the sum total of humiliation which the nation would like to forget. Soldiers were sent to a tropical climate in winter uniforms—or with khaki blouses and heavy flannel shirts. Medical stores were incomplete. Railroad tracks at Tampa were blocked for miles with cars filled with supplies tightly shut by red tape at which officers gazed helplessly. There was no system for loading the transports. Hospital ambulances were shipped —the body of the wagons in the hold of one steamer, the wheels in the hold of another! There was no assignment of regiments to transports—or else several regiments would be assigned to one transport. Some of the transports were old and slow. Lighters and boats for disem-

barking men and supplies were forgotten.

But why dwell longer on so painful a subject? When Theodore Roosevelt became President the people of the United States looked to him to reorganize the army. He had served in the entire Cuban campaign. He had witnessed the humiliation as well as shared in the glory. He knew where the trouble lay—and all the people knew that he knew, and were confident that he would devote all the energy of his tireless nature to weeding out abuses and to remedy painfully apparent defects.

The reorganization of the rotten, rusted, broken-down army machine was a task which the American people expected Roosevelt to perform. He set about it in his usual prudent but vigorous way. He has kept at the task. Some patriots who never remove their eyes from the spoils of office show a disposition to find fault. They frequently raise the clamor that Roosevelt aspires to be the "war lord" of the republic. They like to compare him

to the Kaiser. They hint gloomily at a "military dictatorship." They even shudder at the prospect of a nation of 80,000,000 free citizens being ground beneath the heel of a "military despot" who, with an army of 59,866 enlisted men, exclusive of Philippine constabulary, Indian scouts and the hospital corps, proposes to ride, cowboy fashion, with lariat in hand, over the liberties of the people!

It is scarcely necessary to insult either the President or the intelligence of the people by denying these absurd fears of partisan enemies. President Roosevelt is only doing with the army what the people themselves demanded he should do. President McKinley had begun the work of army reorganization immediately upon the close of the Spanish-American war. Roosevelt took up the work where McKinley, stricken by the hand of an assassin, was compelled to lay it down. He accepted the duty, just as he has accepted all other responsibilities that came to him with the presidential office.

In his first message to congress President Roosevelt urged upon congress the necessity for a thorough reorganization of the army. It is significant to note that he did not ask for a greater army, but a better one. He wrote:

"It is not necessary to increase our army beyond its present size at this time. But it is necessary to keep it at the highest point of efficiency. The individual units, who as officers and enlisted men compose this army are, we have good reason to believe, at least as efficient as those of any other army in the entire world. It is our duty to see that their training is of a kind to insure the highest possible expression of power to these units when acting in combination.

"The conditions of modern war are such as to make an infinitely heavier demand than ever before upon the individual character and capacity of the officer and enlisted man, and to make it far more difficult for men to act together with effect. At present, fighting must be done in ex-



ETHAN ALLEN HITCHCOCK,
Secretary of the Interior.

tended order, which means that each man must act for himself, and at the same time act in combination with others with whom he is no longer in the old-fashioned elbow-to-elbow touch. Under such conditions a few men of the highest excellence are worth more than many men without the special skill which is only to be found as the result of special training applied to men of exceptional physique and morale. But nowadays the most valuable fighting man and the most difficult to perfect is the rifleman who is also a skillful and daring rider.

"The American cavalryman, trained to manoeuvre and fight with equal facility on foot and on horseback, is the best type of soldier for general purposes to be found in the world. The ideal cavalryman of the present day is a man who can fight on foot as effectively as the best infantryman, and who is in addition unsurpassed in the care and management of his horse.

"A general staff should be created. As for the present staff and supply depart-

ments, they should be filled by details from the line, the men so detailed returning after a while to their line duties. It is very undesirable to have the senior grades of the army composed of men who have come to fill the positions by the mere fact of seniority. A system should be adopted by which there shall be an elimination, grade by grade, of those who seem unfit to render the best service in the next grade. Justice to the veterans of the civil war who are still in the army would seem to require that in the matter of retirements they be given the same privileges accorded to their comrades in the navy."

Congress responded to President Roosevelt's request and passed the law creating the present General Staff. The change from the old to the new system was made so naturally that its immediate effect was scarcely noticeable. The army today, as the result of President Roosevelt's efforts, is governed by a staff of trained officers who owe their appointment to their recog-

nized ability, not to the mere fact of their seniority in grade.

The army owes another reform to President Roosevelt. He had witnessed the painful, humiliating mistakes that had accompanied the mobilization and transportation of an army to Cuba. He had not only seen it but felt it. One of his first thoughts upon becoming commander-in-chief was to remedy the glaring defects—defects due solely to lack of training of officers and men. In his first message to congress he made the following recommendations, radical in the departure they proposed from all past experience in the army. He wrote:

"Our army is so small and so much scattered that it is difficult to give the higher officers (as well as the lower officers and the enlisted men) a chance to practice manoeuvres in mass and on comparatively a large scale. In the time of need no amount of individual excellence would avail against the paralysis which would follow inability to work as a co-

herent whole, under skillful and daring leadership. The congress should provide means whereby it will be possible to have field exercises by at least a division of regulars, and if possible also a division of national guardsmen, once a year.

"These exercises might take the form of field manoeuvres; or, if on the gulf coast, or the Pacific or Atlantic seaboard, or in the region of the Great Lakes, the army corps, when assembled, could be marched from some inland point to some point on the water, there embarked, disembarked, after a couple of days' journey, at some other point, and again marched inland. Only by actual handling and providing for men in masses while they are marching, camping, embarking and disembarking, will it be possible to train the higher officers to perform their duties well and smoothly."

The President's suggestion was applauded by the entire country. The necessity was apparent and the means practicable. Congress provided the means to

carry out the suggestions to a limited extent and for two years the field manoeuvres of the army and the national guard regiments have taken place near Fort Riley, Kan. The exercises were absolutely unique in the history of the army in time of peace. They were witnessed by the trained military experts of Europe. Great Britain sent Ian Hamilton, one of its greatest generals, to study the manoeuvres, and his report, coinciding with the reports of other foreign officers trained in the science and art of war, fully justified the declaration made by Lord Wolseley, commander-in-chief of the British army, to the effect that the army of the United States, except in point of size, is the best in the world.

President Roosevelt has done much for the army. There is vigor in its administration where formerly there was senility and inefficiency. The officers work more thoroughly in harmony. There is more incentive to the younger officers to work harder in order to prove their efficiency,

for no longer does the paralyzing effects of the old regime of seniority hamper their efforts. What President Roosevelt has done for the army, he has done for the navy. The officers of the navy now study the problems of marine warfare—not in text books—but in actual practice. The naval manoeuvres off the Maine coast, in Long Island sound and off Culebra island, near Porto Rico, have taught naval officers how to solve practical problems of attack and defense.

And all this to satisfy the ambition of a president to be a "war lord," to enable him to satisfy a craving for the "pomp and circumstance of glorious war?" Not so. Listen to what he says:

"Probably no other nation in the world is so anxious for peace as we are. There is not a single civilized power which has anything whatever to fear from aggressiveness on our part. All we want is peace; and toward this end we wish to be able to secure the same respect for our rights from others which we are eager

and anxious to extend to their rights in return, to insure fair treatment to us commercially, and to guarantee the safety of the American people."

CHAPTER IX.

THE UNITED STATES: A WORLD POWER FOR PEACE.

THE war with Spain made the United States a world power. In that struggle, brief as it was, the aegis of the Great Republic was extended to Porto Rico, the sentinel island of the Atlantic, and to the Philippines, at the very gates of Asia. Just as the Monroe doctrine had made the United States the paramount power on the western hemisphere, the treaty of peace with Spain made the Great Republic the dominant force in the Pacific. No longer could the people of the United States boast of the splendid isolation of their republic. Their flag had crossed the western ocean—to stay.

Call it the fortunes of war—call it Manifest Destiny—call it what you will—but from the day that the victorious armies and fleets of the Great Republic shattered

the last remnants of Spain's once glorious empire in the Atlantic and in the Pacific, the United States became a world power—no longer to be ignored in the councils of the great nations of the earth.

With the United States in possession of the Philippines the nations of Europe could no longer ignore the rights of the republic to a voice in the direction of Far Eastern affairs. Prior to the war with Spain Europe, recognizing the superior advantages possessed by the United States, had been planning quietly but effectively to close the doors of the orient to the commerce of America. China's interests were not consulted. England, Germany, France and Russia had practically divided that slumbering giant, the Chinese empire, among themselves. England had selected for her "sphere of influence" the entire Yang-tse valley, stretching across the Yellow Empire from Burma to the Pacific. France was conceded control of all of China south of the Yang-tse valley. Germany had taken possession of Shan Tung

and the northwest provinces, while Russia was establishing herself in Manchuria, with one hand outstretched toward Pekin itself where one day she hoped to make the greatest capital of the orient the seat of Muscovite power in the Far East.

The United States was not consulted in this proposed dismemberment of an empire; but Dewey's guns conquered the Philippines and the United States became an Asiatic power, no longer to be snubbed and ignored.

The powers of Europe did not welcome the United States to the council board of the Far East, but they admitted her, because there was nothing else to do. The logic of the situation was with the American government and they were prepared to submit and did submit to the inevitable.

The United States took the first step in the solution of the Far Eastern problem. In September, 1899, Secretary Hay instructed the American representatives in England, France, Germany, Russia, Italy and Japan to intimate to those govern-

ments the apprehension felt by the United States government of the danger of complications arising between the powers that might imperil the rights assured to the United States by treaty.

In the negotiation thus begun, the European governments concerned were warned that the government of the United States would not commit itself to any recognition of exclusive rights of any power within or control over any portion of the Chinese empire under the agreements recently made by which Great Britain, Germany and Russia claimed and conceded to each other the possession of spheres of influence or interest.

Hoping to retain China as an open market for the world's commerce, the United States requested the powers claiming spheres of influence in China to declare their intentions with regard to the treatment of foreign trade in those spheres and asked from each a declaration to the effect that it would in no wise interfere with

any treaty port or vested interest of the United States.

In other words the United States, conscious of its new born powers, notified the nations of Europe that they would not be permitted to close the ports of China to the trade and commerce of the United States. As that was just what the nations of Europe had been planning to do the demands of the United States came as an unexpected blow. Again, the logic of the situation was with the United States and the European powers acquiesced. England was the first to make the pledge exacted by the United States; Germany followed, and then Russia, France, Italy and Japan, in the order named. The United States on March 20, 1900, accepted the pledges of the powers to maintain the open door in China, at the same time announcing that the pledges would be considered irrevocable.

Thus by a single bold stroke of diplomacy the United States made nugatory all of Europe's carefully planned schemes for

the partition of China by a system of spheres of influence. A sphere of influence in which the United States had secured equal rights, not only for herself but for all the world, was of little or no value.

With her added dignity as a world power for peace the United States has, since the close of the war with Spain, built a navy that is excelled in strength by the navies of only Great Britain and France. The United States fought the war with Spain with only eight battleships and two armored cruisers. Now we have twenty-five of the greatest battleships of the world in commission and building and ten powerful cruisers. Only the two powers referred to have more, and the United States is building ships of the line of battle more rapidly than any other nation. With a great naval base in the Philippines and another in the Hawaiian islands, both fortified and equipped, the American navy is in a position to dominate the Pacific. With the Panama canal uniting the waters of the Atlantic and the Pacific, fortified at each

end, the naval power of the United States is further enabled to guard American commerce and to control the greatest ocean highway between the Old World and the Far East. With two naval bases on the island of Cuba and two at Porto Rico the United States dominates the West Indies and the Caribbean Sea.

No other nation, Great Britain alone excepted, has in its hands so many elements of naval strength. With a powerful navy, strong enough to protect American shores at home and in Asia, and strong enough to protect American rights and American interests in any quarter of the globe, is it any wonder that the nations of Europe, whose horizons are clouded by the smoke of battle fleets and whose monarchs are hedged about with bayonets, are quick to recognize the United States as a world power? The nations of Europe recognize one material fact in the universe—force.

And yet, Europe has come to recognize that the United States is a world power—not for the dismemberment of impassive

empires—not for conquest—but for peace. The idea of a world power for peace is a new one in the text book of old world politics.

The influence and power of the United States in the maintenance of the world's peace has become a recognized factor in international politics. The credit for this is due largely to Theodore Roosevelt. His messages to congress and his public addresses since he became president, have made him the recognized advocate of peace among the nations of the earth. He has insisted that the United States should supply herself with that power by which alone a nation may enforce its rights and protect its interests. But he has insisted in every public utterance that only by the acquirement of such naval power can the United States hope to stand among the nations of the earth fearless and respected.

In his first message to congress he wrote these words:

"The work of upbuilding the navy must be steadily continued. No one point of our

policy, foreign or domestic, is more important than this to the honor and material welfare, and above all to the peace of our nation in the future. Whether we desire it or not, we must henceforth recognize that we have international duties no less than international rights.

"So far from being in any way a provocation to war, an adequate and highly trained navy is the best guaranty against war, the cheapest and most effective peace insurance. The cost of building and maintaining such a navy represents the very lightest premium for insuring peace which this nation can possibly pay.

"Probably no other great nation in the world is so anxious for peace as we are. There is not a single civilized power which has anything to fear from aggressiveness on our part. All we want is peace; and toward this end we wish to be able to secure the same respect for our rights from others which we are eager and anxious to extend to their rights in return, to insure fair

treatment to us commercially and to guarantee the safety of the American people.

"Our people intend to abide by the Monroe Doctrine, and to insist upon it as the one sure means of securing the peace of the western hemisphere. The navy offers us the only means of making our insistence upon the Monroe Doctrine anything but a subject of derision to whatever nation chooses to disregard it.

"We desire the peace which comes as of right to the just man armed; not the peace granted on terms of ignominy to the craven and the weakling."

In his message to the Fifty-Seventh Congress, President Roosevelt again referred to the United States as a power for peace, saying:

"As a people we have played a large part in the world, and we are bent upon making our future even larger than the past. In particular, the events of the last four years have definitely decided, for woe or for weal, that our place must be great among the nations. We may either fail

greatly or succeed greatly, but we cannot avoid the endeavor from which either great failure or great success must come. Even if we would, we cannot play a small part. If we should try, all that would follow would be that we should play a large part ignobly and shamefully.

"There is not a cloud on the horizon at present. There seems not the slightest chance of trouble with a foreign power. We most earnestly hope that this state of things may continue; and the way to insure its continuance is to provide for a thoroughly efficient navy. The refusal to maintain such a navy would invite trouble, and if trouble came would insure disaster. Fatuous self-complacency or vanity, or shortsightedness in refusing to prepare for danger, is both foolish and wicked in such a nation as ours and past experience has shown that such fatuity in refusing to recognize or prepare for any crisis in advance, is usually succeeded by mad panic of hysterical fear, once the crisis has actually arrived."

Outside of his messages to Congress, President Roosevelt has in many public addresses urged the rapidly growing power of the United States as a factor in world peace. In an address at a dinner given by the New York Chamber of Commerce on Nov. 11, 1902, he made the following notable utterance:

"With the great powers of the world we desire no rivalry that is not honorable to both parties. We wish them well. We believe that the trend of the modern spirit is ever stronger toward peace, not war; toward friendship, not hostility, as the normal international attitude. We are glad, indeed, that we are on good terms with all the other peoples of mankind, and no effort on our part shall be spared to secure a continuance of these relations.

"And remember, gentlemen, that we shall be a potent factor for peace largely in proportion to the way in which we make it evident that our attitude is due, not to weakness, not to inability to defend ourselves, but to a genuine repugnance to

wrongdoing, a genuine desire for self-respecting friendship with our neighbor.

"The voice of the weakling or the craven counts for nothing when he clamors for peace, but the voice of the just man armed is potent. We need to keep in a condition of preparedness, especially as regards the navy, not because we want war, but because we desire to stand with those whose plea for peace is listened to with respectful attention."

With the recognition of the United States as a world power has come also a more general recognition by the great nations of Europe of the Monroe Doctrine. Probably no president of the United States has said more in messages to Congress or in public addresses to emphasize the American belief in the Doctrine enunciated by Monroe in 1824, than Theodore Roosevelt. He has enabled the nations of Europe to more clearly understand the famous American principle and he has, it may be said, compelled a more thorough recognition of its full force and effect. The story

of the Venezuelan affair, given elsewhere in these pages, contains the history of the last attempt that will ever be made by a combination of European governments to test the temper of the American people on the question of the Monroe Doctrine. President Roosevelt's part in the events which threatened for a brief time to plunge a South American state into war with Europe is sufficiently set forth. Those events brought from him one of the most notable public addresses made by him during his administration. Addressing a great meeting in Chicago, on April 2, 1903, he said in part:

"Ever since the time when we definitely extended our boundaries to the Pacific and southward to the gulf, since the time when the old Spanish and Portuguese colonies to the south of us asserted their independence, our nation has insisted that because of its primacy in strength among the nations in the Western Hemisphere it has certain duties and responsibilities which oblige it to take a leading part thereon.

"We hold that our interests in this hemisphere are greater than those of any European power possibly can be, and that our duty to ourselves and to the weaker republics who are our neighbors requires us to see that none of the great military powers from across the seas shall encroach upon the territory of the American republics, or acquire control thereover. * * *

"The Monroe Doctrine is not international law, and though I think it may one day become such, this is not necessary as long as it remains a cardinal feature of our foreign policy and as long as we possess both the will and the strength to make it effective.

"This last point, my fellow citizens, is all important, and is one which as a people we can never afford to forget.

"I believe in the Monroe Doctrine with all my heart and soul; I am convinced that the immense majority of our fellow-countrymen so believe in it; but I would infinitely prefer to see us abandon it than to see us put it forward and bluster about it,

and yet fail to build up the efficient fighting strength which in the last resort can alone make it respected by any strong foreign power whose interest it may ever happen to be to violate it.

"Boasting and blustering are as objectionable among nations as among individuals, and the public men of a great nation owe it to their sense of national self-respect to speak courteously of foreign powers, just as a brave and self-respecting man treats all around him courteously. But though to boast is bad, and causelessly to insult another, worse, yet worse than all is it to be guilty of boasting, even without insult, and when called to the proof to be unable to make such boasting good.

"There is a homely old adage which runs: 'If you speak softly and carry a big stick you will go far.' If the American nation will speak softly and yet build and keep at a pitch of the highest training, a thoroughly efficient navy, the Monroe Doctrine will go far."

JUN 23 1904

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